Operation Junction City: Through the Lens of Operational Art and Design
By MSG Jeremy C. Sims
The Vietnam War posed significant challenges to the U.S. Military, requiring a multifaceted approach in order to achieve strategic objectives. Operation Junction City, one of the largest military operations of the Vietnam War, exemplified the importance of strategic planning and coordination at the joint level (Paschall, 2016). The effectiveness of joint planning and the elements of operational art and design, utilized during the planning process proved invaluable in the operation’s success. This success hinged on the ends, ways, and means used by the joint force, identified, and assessed through the execution of friendly and enemy centers of gravity (COG), lines of operation (LOO), and lines of effort (LOE). The purpose of this paper is to offer a comprehensive analysis of joint planning and the application of the elements of operational art and design during Operation Junction City; as well as provide insight into the application of joint planning within a complex operational environment and its efficacy in achieving strategic objectives.
Battle of Ia Drang
By Sgt. Maj Clayton Dos Santos, Sgt. Maj Dale J. Dukes and Mr. James Perdue
During the Vietnam War, the United States (U.S.) forces launched a bold mission in the contested region called the Ia Drang Valley.[1] Considered for many as the first major battle during the war between the U.S. Army and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), both sides showed the importance of tactics, key equipment, and capabilities to overcome an enemy in severely restricted terrain. The Battle of Ia Drang brought a clash to the confidence of U.S. Soldiers, who possessed effective fire support and close air support during operations, against a trained indigenous enemy who knew very well the terrain and was acclimatized to the weather in that region.[2] This article will explore the intent of the forces engaged in this battle, some of the important actions developed during this conflict, and the aftermath that ensued. With these topics in mind, it is relevant to first examine the historical background in order to better exploit the lessons-learned and the outcome of this battle.
The Green Beret Affair: A Factual Review
By Terry McIntosh
After serving six months in country Vietnam with Special Forces C and B Teams, I was assigned to A-Team 414 operating in the Ken Tuong Province, Mekong Delta. The base camp sat a stone’s throw from the Cambodian border, and provided front line defense aimed at NVA and Viet Cong units based in the neighboring country. The team also hosted a top secret intelligence gathering operation “over the fence” inside of Cambodia. The Intel net was a part of Project Gamma, and was illegal in regards to agreements between the United States and Vietnam, and political restraints that forbade US incursions into Cambodia at that time. The site was valuable to Project Gamma due to its location. The B57 Intelligence Office assigned three men to operate the spy network. Their cover names were Capt. Martin, radio operator Scotty, and Case Manager Mike. Cover names were used so that they could disappear on a moment’s notice without being traceable. They were spies and not protected by the Geneva Convention.
America's Paradoxical Trinity: WWII and Vietnam
By Walter S. Zapotoczny
According to Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth century military philosopher, war is always comprised of what he called a paradoxical trinity. In his book On War, Clausewitz described this trinity as an interactive set of three basic dominant tendencies that drive the events of war. He said the trinity is composed of: "primordial violence, hatred, and hostility; its element of subordination as an instrument of policy; and the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam." Each of these tendencies generally, but not exclusively, corresponds to one of three groups in society. The first of these three tendencies correspond mainly to the people; the second to the government; the third to the commander and his army. Clausewitz writes that these tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject, and yet variable in their relationship to one another. He says the outcome of war is never determined by one tendency alone but by the interaction between them, which is forever and unavoidably shifting.
The Green Beret Affair: A Brief Introduction
By Bob Seals
By the year 1969 United States involvement in South Vietnam was in its fourth year with no end in sight. Major U.S. ground combat forces, to include elite paratroops and marines, had been first committed in country during the spring of 1965. The fighting had increased in scale and intensity until by 1969 U.S. military strength stood at 536,000 on the ground. The Navy's 7th Fleet in the Tonkin Gulf, and Air Force strategic bombers flying from bases on Guam and Thailand provided major sea and air support for US forces on the ground. The South East Asia Treaty Organization nations of Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines would provide yet another 62,000 allied troops fighting against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Communist forces.[1] The Vietnam War, and peace talks in Paris, continued to drag on in 1969 with little end in sight.
The Cambodian Incursion: A Hard Line for Change
By Major Jeremiah S. Boenisch
On 1 May 1970, United States and South Vietnamese units launched a ground and air offensive into neutral Cambodia to eliminate North Vietnamese sanctuaries used for frequent raids into South Vietnam. Dubbed the Cambodian Incursion by President Nixon, the U.S. ground operation took place over a 60-day period from 1 May to 29 June and was overlapped by Allied air strikes and a 75 day South Vietnamese incursion.[1] By combining the efforts of the South Vietnamese, devastating air power, and army ground forces, the Allied Forces overwhelmed enemy positions and supply points resulting in thousands of enemy killed and an unprecedented recovery of enemy materiel. Although the incursion is sometimes portrayed as a strategic failure, it was not. This paper will illustrate that the campaign, though unpopular, was actually the key event necessary for severing the enemy's lines of communications and logistics in Cambodia, aiding the successful withdrawal program, saving U.S. credibility, and showing the success of Vietnamization.
Dien Bien Phu: A Battle Assessment
By David Pennington
Jules Roy described Dien Bien Phu as the "setting in which the West had suffered one of the greatest disasters in its history."[1] An assessment of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu reveals that the French had no clear objective, ignored conventional theories of warfare, over relied on air power, and underestimated the abilities of their adversary. An objective investigation of the events at Dien Bien Phu from November 1953 to May 1954 reveals that for as much as the French did wrong, the Vietminh did right. When French Premier Rene Mayer selected General Henri Navarre to become the commander in chief of French forces in Indochina, he instructed him to create a military scenario in Indochina that would bring about a satisfactory political conclusion to hostilities there.[2] Navarre surveyed the situation in Indochina and concluded the greatest threat to achieving his given objective was in Tonkin; the Navarre Plan was the result.
The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969-1972
By John M. Rincon
This article will analyze the disjointed and ill-conceived plan to withdraw United States combat troops from Southeast Asia initiated in 1969. It will also assess how the removal of those troops directly affected the ability of the Armed Forces of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) to withstand Communist aggression. An examination of three pivotal military operations: the combined U.S.-ARVN incursion of Cambodia in March 1970, the invasion of Laos by ARVN troops in February 1971, and the 1972 Communist Easter Offensive, will illustrate negative effects on ARVN caused by this process of American de-escalation. The most critical of those being; inadequate training of ARVN, the lack of establishing a basic military criteria for the promotion of ARVN officers and non-commissioned officers, and never achieving full parity in ARVN morale with that of its enemy.
By MSG Jeremy C. Sims
The Vietnam War posed significant challenges to the U.S. Military, requiring a multifaceted approach in order to achieve strategic objectives. Operation Junction City, one of the largest military operations of the Vietnam War, exemplified the importance of strategic planning and coordination at the joint level (Paschall, 2016). The effectiveness of joint planning and the elements of operational art and design, utilized during the planning process proved invaluable in the operation’s success. This success hinged on the ends, ways, and means used by the joint force, identified, and assessed through the execution of friendly and enemy centers of gravity (COG), lines of operation (LOO), and lines of effort (LOE). The purpose of this paper is to offer a comprehensive analysis of joint planning and the application of the elements of operational art and design during Operation Junction City; as well as provide insight into the application of joint planning within a complex operational environment and its efficacy in achieving strategic objectives.
Battle of Ia Drang
By Sgt. Maj Clayton Dos Santos, Sgt. Maj Dale J. Dukes and Mr. James Perdue
During the Vietnam War, the United States (U.S.) forces launched a bold mission in the contested region called the Ia Drang Valley.[1] Considered for many as the first major battle during the war between the U.S. Army and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), both sides showed the importance of tactics, key equipment, and capabilities to overcome an enemy in severely restricted terrain. The Battle of Ia Drang brought a clash to the confidence of U.S. Soldiers, who possessed effective fire support and close air support during operations, against a trained indigenous enemy who knew very well the terrain and was acclimatized to the weather in that region.[2] This article will explore the intent of the forces engaged in this battle, some of the important actions developed during this conflict, and the aftermath that ensued. With these topics in mind, it is relevant to first examine the historical background in order to better exploit the lessons-learned and the outcome of this battle.
The Green Beret Affair: A Factual Review
By Terry McIntosh
After serving six months in country Vietnam with Special Forces C and B Teams, I was assigned to A-Team 414 operating in the Ken Tuong Province, Mekong Delta. The base camp sat a stone’s throw from the Cambodian border, and provided front line defense aimed at NVA and Viet Cong units based in the neighboring country. The team also hosted a top secret intelligence gathering operation “over the fence” inside of Cambodia. The Intel net was a part of Project Gamma, and was illegal in regards to agreements between the United States and Vietnam, and political restraints that forbade US incursions into Cambodia at that time. The site was valuable to Project Gamma due to its location. The B57 Intelligence Office assigned three men to operate the spy network. Their cover names were Capt. Martin, radio operator Scotty, and Case Manager Mike. Cover names were used so that they could disappear on a moment’s notice without being traceable. They were spies and not protected by the Geneva Convention.
America's Paradoxical Trinity: WWII and Vietnam
By Walter S. Zapotoczny
According to Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth century military philosopher, war is always comprised of what he called a paradoxical trinity. In his book On War, Clausewitz described this trinity as an interactive set of three basic dominant tendencies that drive the events of war. He said the trinity is composed of: "primordial violence, hatred, and hostility; its element of subordination as an instrument of policy; and the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam." Each of these tendencies generally, but not exclusively, corresponds to one of three groups in society. The first of these three tendencies correspond mainly to the people; the second to the government; the third to the commander and his army. Clausewitz writes that these tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject, and yet variable in their relationship to one another. He says the outcome of war is never determined by one tendency alone but by the interaction between them, which is forever and unavoidably shifting.
The Green Beret Affair: A Brief Introduction
By Bob Seals
By the year 1969 United States involvement in South Vietnam was in its fourth year with no end in sight. Major U.S. ground combat forces, to include elite paratroops and marines, had been first committed in country during the spring of 1965. The fighting had increased in scale and intensity until by 1969 U.S. military strength stood at 536,000 on the ground. The Navy's 7th Fleet in the Tonkin Gulf, and Air Force strategic bombers flying from bases on Guam and Thailand provided major sea and air support for US forces on the ground. The South East Asia Treaty Organization nations of Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines would provide yet another 62,000 allied troops fighting against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Communist forces.[1] The Vietnam War, and peace talks in Paris, continued to drag on in 1969 with little end in sight.
The Cambodian Incursion: A Hard Line for Change
By Major Jeremiah S. Boenisch
On 1 May 1970, United States and South Vietnamese units launched a ground and air offensive into neutral Cambodia to eliminate North Vietnamese sanctuaries used for frequent raids into South Vietnam. Dubbed the Cambodian Incursion by President Nixon, the U.S. ground operation took place over a 60-day period from 1 May to 29 June and was overlapped by Allied air strikes and a 75 day South Vietnamese incursion.[1] By combining the efforts of the South Vietnamese, devastating air power, and army ground forces, the Allied Forces overwhelmed enemy positions and supply points resulting in thousands of enemy killed and an unprecedented recovery of enemy materiel. Although the incursion is sometimes portrayed as a strategic failure, it was not. This paper will illustrate that the campaign, though unpopular, was actually the key event necessary for severing the enemy's lines of communications and logistics in Cambodia, aiding the successful withdrawal program, saving U.S. credibility, and showing the success of Vietnamization.
Dien Bien Phu: A Battle Assessment
By David Pennington
Jules Roy described Dien Bien Phu as the "setting in which the West had suffered one of the greatest disasters in its history."[1] An assessment of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu reveals that the French had no clear objective, ignored conventional theories of warfare, over relied on air power, and underestimated the abilities of their adversary. An objective investigation of the events at Dien Bien Phu from November 1953 to May 1954 reveals that for as much as the French did wrong, the Vietminh did right. When French Premier Rene Mayer selected General Henri Navarre to become the commander in chief of French forces in Indochina, he instructed him to create a military scenario in Indochina that would bring about a satisfactory political conclusion to hostilities there.[2] Navarre surveyed the situation in Indochina and concluded the greatest threat to achieving his given objective was in Tonkin; the Navarre Plan was the result.
The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969-1972
By John M. Rincon
This article will analyze the disjointed and ill-conceived plan to withdraw United States combat troops from Southeast Asia initiated in 1969. It will also assess how the removal of those troops directly affected the ability of the Armed Forces of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) to withstand Communist aggression. An examination of three pivotal military operations: the combined U.S.-ARVN incursion of Cambodia in March 1970, the invasion of Laos by ARVN troops in February 1971, and the 1972 Communist Easter Offensive, will illustrate negative effects on ARVN caused by this process of American de-escalation. The most critical of those being; inadequate training of ARVN, the lack of establishing a basic military criteria for the promotion of ARVN officers and non-commissioned officers, and never achieving full parity in ARVN morale with that of its enemy.
