By SGM Lucas W. Pedigo

By the winter of 2010 to 2011, the Soldiers of Company E, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division were accustomed to a harsh operational rhythm in Paktika Province. On the unimproved road network that linked Forward Operating Base Sharana to Forward Operating Base Khushamand and onward toward Waza K’wah, driving fifty miles in twelve hours was not an exaggeration. It was the norm. That reality was captured in public affairs reporting from the area during late January 2011, which described how convoys measured progress by the hour rather than by the mile and how a single obstacle could consume most of a day (Sinders, 2011). At brigade level, leaders also described Paktika as an area where terrain, distance, and persistent insurgent pressure combined to challenge command, control, and logistics, even as additional coalition forces surged into the province (Parrish, 2011).

Distro Platoon, Echo Company, was responsible for sustaining that road network through daily combat logistics patrols. The platoon executed combat logistics patrols that pushed fuel, rations, construction materials, and repair parts to infantry companies operating on distant outposts. The ground dictated the plan. Paktika's valleys are repeatedly cut by dry riverbeds known as wadis. In the rainy season these wadies would rush like rivers. In dry months, the wadis turn to powder. In winter, the soil can be cold and deceptively loose under the crust. The worst crossing on the Sharana to Khushamand route stretched roughly two hundred feet of deep sand with a steep embankment on the far side. At that site, heavily loaded vehicles bogged, recovery crews worked into the night, and convoys that started in formation strung out across the desert. Public documentation from the same January period records that a single wadi crossing could take eight hours when vehicles sank in place (Sinders, 2011).

In January 2011, E Company prepared for a major movement to Waza K’wah. Beginning on 17 January, fifty-two Soldiers loaded sixty-four pallets of Class I rations, one hundred twenty-eight pallets of Class IV materials such as concertina wire and sandbags, two refrigerated vans with fresh produce and meat, and a host nation element of thirty jingle trucks loaded with between five thousand and seven thousand gallons of JP‑8 each. The convoy departed FOB Sharana on 21 January, linked up with a Route Clearance Platoon on Route Audi, and moved deliberately toward Khushamand. Route Clearance, using ground penetrating radar and deliberate interrogation of suspect points, set a slow baseline of less than five mph, for movement, in keeping with the deliberate pace documented in contemporary accounts of RCP operations in RC-East (Rasmussen, 2011; Law, 2010). The convoy arrived in the vicinity of Waza K’wah on 24 January and returned to Sharana three days later.

The threat on that route was a mix of improvised explosive devices, harassing small arms fire, and sporadic indirect fire. Enemy teams favored attacking convoys when they were forced to halt at chokepoints. That is a predictable pattern wherever roads are few and obstacles are fixed. Reporting from the period shows that insurgent groups in Paktika combined direct fire, rockets, mortars, intimidation, and route denial to slow movement and undermine local governance (Parrish, 2011). Route clearance sources describe a reality in which clearing ten to thirty miles could take hours and in which a single blast or suspicious culvert could stall a movement for the better part of a day (Rasmussen, 2011; Law, 2010).

Finding and Testing a Better Way

At the center of the January mission was a practical problem that had frustrated several prior convoys. The two hundred feet of loose sand near Khushamand consumed time, manpower, and attention, and the enemy noticed the pattern. Staff Sergeant Lucas Pedigo, the Distribution Platoon Sergeant, had an idea that he first developed during a platoon run on FOB Sharana. Near the airfield fencing sat rolled woven access mats. He had not seen them used on the route, but he recognized their potential to distribute load and provide traction across soft sand. Rather than wait for engineers or request specialized bridging, he brought the platoon to investigate the material and directed hands-on training. In a makeshift wadi between two hills on Sharana, Soldiers unrolled the mats, aligned the seams, and drove across them at controlled speeds until the technique felt routine.

The equipment was suitable for the task. The platoon used roll-out ground access mats marketed under the MOBI‑MAT brand. Manufacturer documentation describes product families designed to improve ground bearing on soft soils and to provide non-skid traction surfaces for repeated wheeled traffic. Variants are deployable by hand or with mounted dispensers and can be staked or anchored to prevent movement (Deschamps SAS, n.d.-a; Deschamps Mats Systems Inc., n.d.). Although engineer units often employ similar matting to reinforce bridge approaches or airfield shoulders, the Distribution Platoon repurposed the capability as a convoy mobility tool that could be carried on FMTVs and a wrecker, then emplaced quickly at a known obstacle.



Execution at the Wadi

When the convoy reached the wadi on 22 January, the platoon executed its rehearsal. Staff Sergeant James Kemp, the gun truck squad leader, oriented his MATV and gun trucks to secure the site. During emplacement, the convoy received small arms fire from a three to five-man enemy element. The gun truck crews suppressed and neutralized the threat, preserving the window the platoon needed to finish the lane. Ten mats, each twenty feet by twenty feet, were unrolled, aligned, and smoothed to create a lane across the entire span. Sergeant Matthew Dinkins, a transportation team leader, managed the placement details so that seams would not catch tires. Sergeant First Class Matthew Beck, the maintenance platoon sergeant, and Specialist Richard Magee operated the wrecker to lift and position the heavy rolls. Staff Sergeant Joseph Queen, the transportation squad leader, then controlled movement over the mat surface, enforcing a one vehicle at a time rule and using ground guides to manage approach and exit.

The results were immediate. What had frequently consumed eight hours now took just over one hour for the entire convoy to cross. Public affairs reporting from this same period and location recorded an identical reduction when mats were first employed, noting that the technique turned a chronic chokepoint into a manageable phase of the march (Sinders, 2011). The platoon arrived early to Waza K’wah, where Soldiers from D Company, 1‑506 were staged and ready to help unload. The technique remained the platoon's standard operating procedure through redeployment in August 2011.

Operational Context and Why the Method Worked

Terrain, time, and threat were linked in Paktika. The brigade responsible for security in the province described the area as large, underdeveloped, and crisscrossed by river valleys and wadis that split communities and complicated sustainment. Leaders emphasized how the lack of hard roads forced a greater reliance on air for priority resupply while ground convoys confronted predictable obstacles and enemy harassment (Parrish, 2011). Against that backdrop, Distro Platoon's technique addressed three problems at once. First, it created a temporary road surface where none existed, dispersing vehicle load and providing traction. Second, it restored control over time at a chokepoint that had previously dictated the day's schedule. Third, it compressed the convoy's exposure window during a phase that enemy teams were known to target.

The material properties of roll-out access mats enabled that effect. Published specifications and marketing materials highlight that MOBI‑MAT products can be used to reinforce soft soils, support heavy wheeled traffic, and provide non-skid surfaces. Some variants are specifically designed to strengthen bridge access points or ground approaches where wheels churn and cut into sand or mud (Deschamps SAS, n.d.-a; Deschamps Mats Systems Inc., n.d.). When a logistics platoon can carry those mats on its own trucks, the capability becomes portable and repeatable. The real advantage came from how the team employed the mats. Placement accuracy, disciplined crossing intervals, and single-vehicle movement across the lane limited shear on the seams and preserved the surface for the full serial. That is the kind of movement control that convoy doctrine expects of small-unit leaders who must adapt techniques to local conditions (Department of the Army, 2021; Department of the Army, 2014/2016).

Applied Critical Thinking and Problem Solving

The decision to use mats was more than a clever trick. It reflected a pattern of critical and creative thinking that Army doctrine encourages. The operations process described in ADP 5‑0 frames how commanders and staffs plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. It explicitly calls for the use of both analytical and creative thought, supported by reconnaissance, rehearsals, and assessment to refine actions over time (Department of the Army, 2019). In staff references that elaborate the military decision-making process, the Army emphasizes structured problem solving, course of action development, and the importance of rehearsals and after-action reviews as mechanisms for learning and adaptation (Department of the Army, 2020).

At the small-unit level, troop leading procedures provide an eight-step, time-sensitive framework for leaders to receive a mission, issue warning orders, make a tentative plan, initiate movement, conduct reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue orders, and supervise and refine. The emphasis on reconnaissance, rehearsal, and supervision maps directly onto what Distro Platoon did at Sharana and at the wadi crossing (ATP 3‑21.8, Appendix A; Maneuver Center of Excellence, n.d.). The platoon did not introduce a new method blindly. It tested the material on friendly ground, learned the handling characteristics, and built a repeatable sequence that could hold up under the stress of enemy contact.

This sequence also aligns with Colonel John Boyd's well-known decision cycle of observe, orient, decide, and act. Boyd's writing argues that organizations gain advantage when they can cycle through observation and orientation to decision and action faster and with more accuracy than their opponent, while constantly updating their mental models of the environment (Boyd, 2018). Distro Platoon observed a recurring problem on the route, oriented on a potential solution discovered near the airfield, decided to rehearse, and acted to implement the technique under contact. The cycle continued as the platoon institutionalized the method and refined it across subsequent convoys.

Doctrine in the Background, Initiative in the Foreground

The Army does not prescribe a single technique for every obstacle on every route. Instead, the doctrine behind tactical convoy operations describes responsibilities and expectations, then asks leaders to exercise disciplined initiative within the commander's intent. The Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations provide quick-reference guidance for commander actions, security integration, and battle drills, but they also emphasize that commanders must adapt techniques to the environment and the threat (Department of the Army, 2021). FM 6‑0 on commander and staff organization and operations, and ADP 5‑0 on the operations process, both stress that mission command depends on shared understanding, prudent risk, and the encouragement of subordinate initiative (Department of the Army, 2014/2016; Department of the Army, 2019).

Rehearsal, Execution, and Assessment

The platoon's rehearsal at Sharana mattered as much as the equipment. The practice run in a makeshift wadi allowed leaders to establish signals, confirm the best ways to align seams, and set safe vehicle speeds. It also allowed maintenance Soldiers to practice the lift and laydown of heavy rolls with the wrecker. During execution, the team used ground guides and tight intervals to preserve the mat surface. After the mission, leaders assessed the crossing and codified the procedure as a standing technique for future convoys. That loop from planning to rehearsal to execution to assessment is the heart of the Army operations process and is reinforced in staff references and assessment doctrine that describe how units learn from each iteration (Department of the Army, 2019; Department of the Army, 2020; ALSSA, 2020).

Route Clearance, Exposure Windows, and the Value of Time

Route Clearance Platoons moved slowly by design. Their job was to find and reduce IED hazards so that others could move. Contemporary accounts from RC-East describe route clearance speeds that could drop below ten miles per hour and emphasize how every additional halt increased vulnerability to ambush and complex attacks (Rasmussen, 2011; Law, 2010). In that environment, Distro Platoon's mat technique did not replace route clearance. It complemented it by reducing the time the convoy remained stationary at a known chokepoint. The relationship between exposure time and risk is intuitive to Soldiers who have sat in a kill zone. Reducing a predictable eight-hour halt to just over an hour significantly narrowed the window in which enemy teams could engage the formation.

Supported Units and the Payoff at the Edge

Near Khushamand, elements of C Company, 1‑506 provided security as the convoy approached, and D Company Soldiers assisted with reception at Waza K’wah. For the infantry companies living at the edge of the brigade's battlespace, the difference between a routine delivery and a delayed one was immediate. Class I rations sustain morale and routine. Class IV materials enable the physical security that keeps patrol bases viable. Fuel powers everything. When a distribution platoon introduces a technique that makes arrivals more reliable, the supported units feel the difference in their daily schedules.

Practical Lessons for Distribution Leaders

Several lessons travel well from Paktika. First, rehearse inside the wire. A rehearsal is more than a check-the-box event. It is a disciplined opportunity to discover the friction points before contact. Second, borrow useful tools. Mobility solutions are not the exclusive domain of engineer units. If a logistics platoon can carry, emplace, and recover a capability safely, the tool becomes part of logistics. Third, protect the work window. Security at the obstacle is not a courtesy. It is the condition that allows emplacement to occur. Fourth, control movement. Single-vehicle crossings and strict adherence to ground guides protect the lane and reduce accidents. Fifth, document and share. Recording the procedure in platoon SOPs turns a clever solution into an inherited practice for the next team. These habits align with ADP 5‑0's emphasis on continuous assessment, with FM 6‑0's guidance on roles and responsibilities, and with the quick-reference expectations captured in convoy MTTPs (Department of the Army, 2019; Department of the Army, 2014/2016; Department of the Army, 2021).

Conclusion

In a province where ground itself felt like an adversary, Distro Platoon carried a small amount of ground with them. By training a repeatable method, assigning clear roles, and protecting the minute-by-minute window at a known choke point, the platoon turned a chronic liability into an advantage. The public record from January 2011 confirms the key facts. Soldiers from E Company, 1‑506 used woven mats to span soft sand and reduced a crossing from roughly eight hours to just over one hour (Sinders, 2011). Brigade leaders described the surrounding province as a place where terrain and enemy activity complicated logistics and governance on any given day (Parrish, 2011). Doctrine encourages leaders to think this way. The operations process, the military decision-making process, and troop leading procedures are tools designed to help units observe, orient, decide, and act faster and more effectively than the adversary (Department of the Army, 2019; Department of the Army, 2020; ATP 3‑21.8, Appendix A). In this case, a distribution platoon did exactly that and kept infantry units at the edge supplied and ready.

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Show Notes

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© 2026 By SGM Lucas W. Pedigo

SGM Lucas W. Pedigo is a senior noncommissioned officer in the United States Army with more than 27 years of distinguished service. He currently serves as the Chief Instructor in the Department of Professional Studies at the United States Sergeants Major Academy, where he supports graduate-level education in leadership, adult learning, and instructional design.

SGM Pedigo holds a Bachelor of Arts in Transportation and Logistics Management from American Military University, a Master of Science in Supply Chain Management from Arizona State University, and a Master of Science in Instructional Design, Development, and Evaluation. He has participated in six deployments, serving in roles ranging from truck driver and squad leader to platoon sergeant and first sergeant. He is a graduate of the United States Sergeants Major Academy, Class 72.

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