By Jorge A. Rivera

Kosovo: Sovereignty versus the Responsibility to Protect

Sovereignty is the idea that an independent state can and should govern itself without external influence or interference. The philosopher Thomas Hobbes “argued that in every true state, some person or body of persons must have the ultimate and absolute authority to declare the law; to divide this authority, he held, was essential to destroy the unity of the state” (Sovereignty, 2009, p.1). A problem then arises if a sovereign state violates international law or the natural and legal rights of its citizens within its own borders. What is the legal or moral basis for external actors to interfere in a sovereign state? For example, from 1939 to 1945, Nazi Germany systematically executed millions of Jews as a means to exterminate the Jew problem. “The Nazi trials and the 1948 Genocide Convention reflected a determination in the world community to prevent a recurrence of the Jewish Holocaust” (Sindelar, 2005). Unfortunately, cases of genocide or ethnic cleansing continue to the present day. The international community still cannot find the correct legal and moral balance to ensure the sovereignty of nations and uphold the inalienable rights of people. The United States, as a member of NATO, fulfilled its legal and moral obligation to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo, based on the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the historical events leading to conflict in the Balkans, explores the U.S. and NATO intervention in Kosovo, examines the legal dimensions of such intervention, and conducts an ethical decision framework evaluation of NATO's involvement.

Background

The Balkans

The Balkans have endured centuries of conflict including rule by several empires such as the Roman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Serbian Empire, Byzantine Empire, and Ottoman Empire to name a few. War, migration, and displaced people have shaped and reshaped the Balkan Peninsula through time. The people of Yugoslavia primarily dissented and were in conflict against the occupying force during Empire rule. However, as the empires began to fail or lose power, cultural and ethnic infighting resumed. During World War II, Josip Broz Tito led the resistance against terror and genocide, Tito managed to stimulate a movement of nationalism and unity. After the war, Tito modeled the new Yugoslavia after the Soviet Union, a state of six republics under his leadership. For nearly 40 years, Tito ruled Yugoslavia and maintained order, squashing down any level of dissent among the republics. When Tito died in 1980, so did any force of unification, ethnic fighting started shortly after his death (Judah, 2011, pp. 1-3).

In the 7th Century, a large number of Serbs migrated to the area known as Kosovo today, however, through time Kosovo became a majority of ethnic Albanians. This was a point of friction for Serbians since they considered this area culturally and historically important. Albanian and Serbian nationalism grew in the 1980s and caused serious conflict between the different groups. One of the effects of such conflict was that the Serbian government removed ethnic Albanians from government posts in Kosovo. In response, Kosovars felt disenfranchised, began to riot, protest, and created a shadow ethnic Albanian government in Kosovo. The new Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic saw these riots and the new Kosovo Liberation Army as terrorist actions against his regime. The new Albanian leaders declared an independent Kosovo in 1991, which the Serbian leadership interpreted as an insurgency. In 1998, threats and attacks from the Kosovo Liberation Army on Serbian authorities increased and caused Serbian forces and law enforcement organizations to increase their counterinsurgency operations (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023; Mangum, 2000; Metz, 2001; Nardulli, et al, 2002). The continuous and escalating conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army and Serbian forces produced an estimated “800,000 ethnic Albanians” (Central Intelligence Agency, 2023, p. 1) displaced throughout the region and an “estimated 1,500-2,000 civilians and combatants dead” (Human Rights Watch, n.d., p. 1).

Failed Diplomacy and Warnings

In March of 1998, the UN Security Council approved resolution 1160, effectively “condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army” (NATO Security Council, 1999, p. 1). However, violence continued and was followed by UN resolution 1199, expressing deep concern over “increasing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law, and emphasizing the need to ensure that the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo are respected” (NATO Security Council, 1999, p. 1). The international community including U.S. representatives made many diplomatic attempts to reach a peaceful resolution without success. Most proposals by the international community included the acceptance of peacekeepers or inspectors in the region to ensure peace. These were proposals that the Serbian representatives were not ready to accept. Despite the continued warnings, Serbian forces continued their violent campaign in Kosovo including a massacre of 45 people in the town of Racak (Human Rights Watch, n.d., p. 21). NATO demanded that the perpetrators face justice, a demand that Milosevic did not accept. In March of 1999, Richard Holbrooke, who at the time was serving as a special envoy to the Balkans, met one last time with Milosevic to try to reach a peaceful agreement. After consultation with all members of the alliance, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana ordered General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, to initiate airstrikes (Solana, 1999, p. 1). Solana later stated in a press conference that “All efforts to achieve a negotiated, political solution to the Kosovo crisis having failed, no alternative is open but to take military action” (Solana, 1999, p. 1).

U.S. and NATO Involvement

Operation Allied Force began on 24 March 1999 with more than 200 American aircraft and about 130 aircraft from other members of the alliance. In addition to the air campaign, the allied force alerted and positioned troops in the region and placed naval assets within missile range (NATO Security Council, 1999, p. 1). NATO described its objectives as:

1. A verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;


2. The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;


3. The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;


4. The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations;


5. The establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. (NATO Security Council, 1999, p. 1)

NATO estimates that during the 78-day campaign, the Allied force completed 38,000 sorties, 28% of which were strike sorties. The Allied forces received zero casualties, while the Milosevic forces suffered less than 200 casualties. Furthermore, NATO estimates that at the end of the air campaign nearly 90% of the population of Kosovo was homeless or refugees in another country, over 200,000 Kosovar men were missing, and at least 5,000 had been executed (NATO Topics, 2016; Hickman, 2015).

Legality of Intervention

Kenneth Waltz explains that in the absence of a global sovereignty or global ruler with global authority, anarchy persists. “In an anarchic realm, peace is fragile… potentially destabilizing developments elicit the interest and the calculated response of some or all of the system’s actors” (Waltz, 1988, p. 620). Alliances like NATO and the United Nations exist to resolve disputes peacefully and ensure mutual security (NATO, n.d. p. 1). Research has discovered that there are many arguments in support and in opposition to the use of military action against Milosevic and his forces. One such case is that the United Nations approved resolutions 1160 and 1199 condemning the violence of Serbian forces against the ethnic minority in Kosovo (United Nations, 2010, pp. 130-134), however, “at no time, did the security council authorize the use of armed force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (Mangum, 2000). On the other hand, however, NATO stated that Milosevic’s blatant violations of Security Council resolutions and violent persecution of Kosovar civilians “has created a massive humanitarian catastrophe which also threatens to destabilize the surrounding region” (NATO Security Council, 1999).

In 1948, in the aftermath of the Holocaust by Nazi Germany, the United Nations adopted Resolution 260, also known Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (United Nations General Assembly, 1948, p.1). There are 19 articles under this resolution. Article 1 designates genocide as a crime under international law. Article 2 defines genocide as actions taken to destroy a group or parts of a group based on nationality, ethnicity, race, or religious affiliation. Article 3 describes the type of actions considered criminal. Article 8 explains that any member can call upon the UN to take action as deemed appropriate in order to prevent or suppress acts of genocide. The following paragraph will analyze the legal and moral obligation of the United States, the United Nations, and NATO to take action in order to suppress acts of genocide against civilians in Kosovo.

Analysis of the Legal and Moral Obligation

Dr. Jack D. Kem describes the ethical reasoning model as four simple steps. Important to this paper and to this section is the second step, which discusses evaluating the options. Dr. Kem suggests that when presented with an ethical dilemma, decision-makers use the three ethical lenses (Kem, 2016, p. 4). This section develops shared understanding by providing some definitions and then using that understanding to conduct an analysis of NATO's action through the three ethical lenses.
1. Rules: This is principles-based ethics that evaluates a decision on established rules, laws, values, standards, regulations, or the Constitution.
2. Outcomes: This is consequences-based ethics that evaluates a decision by determining the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people.
3. Virtues: This is virtue-based ethics that evaluates a decision through a perspective of benevolence, justice, or altruism. (Rivera, 2017, p. 5)

Rules

In this analysis, the principles-based ethics evaluates the actions of the alliance based on international law. Milosevic had violated international law by committing genocide in violation of UN Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. After the Holocaust, in 1948 the global community agreed to take action in order to prevent or suppress any crimes against humanity. In defense of innocent civilians and the rule of international law, the U.S. and NATO acted in favor of the rule of law. Unfortunately, neither NATO nor the UN Security Council approved a resolution prior to taking military action against Milosevic forces in Kosovo; this act in itself is a violation of a sovereign state. NATO’s action in this manner is a dangerous decision that can potentially set a precedent for any nation to interfere in the internal matters of another state. In an effort to improve decision-making, the UN approved a resolution known as the Responsibility to Protect which “embodies a political commitment to end the worst forms of violence and persecution” (United Nations, n.d.) and places high importance on being timely and responsive.

Outcomes

Analysis based on consequence-based ethics focuses on the idea that the ends justify the means or that an action brings the most benefit to the greatest number of people. Through this lens, NATO's military action is justified since its objective was to stop the persecution of innocent civilians. Regardless of action or inaction by politicians thousands of miles away, on the ground, in the streets of Kosovo, the people needed an ally that could ensure their safety. Unfortunately, the air campaign lasted far longer than expected and 10 weeks of airstrikes arguably decreased overall safety on the ground. Eventually, Milosevic agreed to pull out his forces from Kosovo and allow a peacekeeping force in Kosovo bringing with it relative safety, security, and international aid and support.

Virtues

Analysis based on virtues-based ethics is sometimes the hardest to explain. Cultures, ideas, what people hold dear, and what causes people to act in a certain way are the very reasons conflict exists. Evaluating a decision based on virtues will vary greatly in a global society. However, in this case, it is simpler. The global community made a promise after the holocaust to not allow any group of people to suffer persecution in that manner. In 1995, during the Srebrenica massacre, which is now known as the “largest act of genocide in Europe since World War II” (Schroder, 2005), 370 peacekeepers passively watched as Bosnian Muslims were taken away by Bosnian Serb forces and later killed over 8,000 men and boys. Those peacekeepers now must live with the knowledge that they were there and did nothing to prevent it. Politicians, NATO, and the UN have broken that promise at least once; how do they explain this to the next generation? After futile attempts at a peaceful agreement, NATO acted accordingly based on the belief of altruism, the promises made, and the expectation inherent in the existence of the alliance.

Summary

The UN Security Council and NATO had the responsibility to take action. In order to not violate another state’s sovereignty, the alliance should have approved a new resolution authorizing military action, but not at the expense of wasting time. In the end, taking military action was the moral and legal decision to take.

Conclusion

The United States, as a member of NATO, fulfilled its legal and moral obligation to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo, based on the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Understanding the historical background of the genesis of the conflict in Kosovo provides the researcher with an understanding of the necessity for action. The U.S. and NATO’s intervention started with diplomatic attempts to reach a peaceful resolution, but a lack of agreement and compliance by Milosevic drove NATO to take military action in Kosovo. It is also important to understand the legal aspects of military intervention to stop or suppress crimes against humanity; in this case, international law was a factor, but moral obligation played a major part in the decision for the alliance to act. Finally, an ethical decision framework is used to provide an analysis of NATO military action; in this section, three ethical lenses were used to explain and justify the U.S. and NATO’s decision to intervene to stop and suppress the violent persecution of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo by Serbian forces.

* * *

Show Notes

* * *

© 2025 Jorge Rivera.

Jorge A. Rivera is an instructor at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy and an adjunct instructor in homeland security at Mary Baldwin University. Jorge Rivera holds master’s degrees from the University of Texas at El Paso and Syracuse University. He uses his background and interests to write on leadership and national security issues. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army or Mary Baldwin University.

* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent those of MilitaryHistoryOnline.com.