"Mission command is the Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation" (Department of the Army [DA], 2019, p. 1-3). Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 states that mission command relies on critical and creative thinking from subordinates who seize the initiative to develop plans and concepts to accomplish the mission (DA, 2019). Additionally, the mission command process requires leaders who understand and accept appropriate operational risks rather than being either risk-averse or risk-tolerant. The Battle of Chosin Reservoir highlights some positive and negative lessons about mission command from both the Chinese and American sides. The battle also highlights instances in which mission command principles were not applied, causing blind spots leading to the withdrawal of United Nations (UN) forces from northern Korea. The purpose of this paper is to examine the Battle of Chosin Reservoir and analyze the successes and failures in applying the United States (US) Army's mission command principles, the elements of command and control (C2), and the C2 warfighting function.
The end of World War II led to a dramatic reduction of American military forces worldwide. While requirements to maintain forces in occupied countries remained, the offensive campaigns of World War II had ended, and America wanted its soldiers home. Post-World War II demobilization left the United States with a total of 590,000 soldiers, down from 1.9 million soldiers in 1946 (Longabaugh, 2014). Executive leaders continued to make poor strategic decisions in the Far East theater in hopes of preventing another conflict. False confidence in U.S. air superiority and nuclear deterrence led executive leaders to believe South Korea was safe from the North Korean invasion. As a result, force readiness deteriorated rapidly, and the South Korean Army and American forces with Task Force Smith were no match for the initial onslaught of North Korean and Chinese soldiers during the beginning of the Korean War.
The Korean War, forever known as the ‘Forgotten War’ by many, lasted a total of 1,127 days, from June 25, 1950, through July 27, 1953—a total of 38 months, a little over three years spanning four calendar years. The conflict began unlike any previous ‘war’ and became known as a ‘Police Action’ for many years, with some in the United States and other countries seeking to call it anything other than what it really was. Too little time had passed since the end of World War II, and the sacrifices and devastation were still vivid in people’s memories. During the war, who could have guessed that its ending would hark back to World War I, the war to end all wars, with trench warfare, bunkers, large amounts of artillery, and a set day and time to stop shooting? The Korean War was and is a difficult war to describe.
This is part II of a four-part chronology of those killed during the Korean War. When reading this article, please keep in mind, as in Part I, that these numbers are only U.S. deaths during the war.
UN and ROK deaths are not included as part of this series. There are two things that stand out for 1951 in Korea.
The vast majority of pilots and aircrew who were killed were listed as ‘Remains Not Recovered’, whether because they had been shot down behind enemy lines or over water, had taken a direct hit, or had failed to pull out of a dive and crashed and burned. The second is that by the end of 1951, as combat operations slowed to a crawl, deaths classified as Died of Other Causes, or ‘DOC’, became a significant factor in the tally of deaths,
sometimes even accounting for more deaths in a day than combat operations.
Vehicle rollovers, accidents of various types, and hemorrhagic fever accounted for a large portion of these DOC
deaths. As 1950 closed out and the new year began, any hope of ‘being home by Christmas’
quickly dissipated for those serving in Korea.
The Korean War sprang from seeds sown well before the North Korean Peoples' Army surged across the 38th Parallel on 25 June 1950.[1] The roots of the conflict penetrate at least as deep as 1905, when the Japanese Army occupied Korea. Annexed in 1910, the Korean peninsula was considered enemy territory by China and the United States, which were allies at the time. In 1943 and 1945, President Roosevelt set the course for Korea to become free and independent following the end of World War II. Until Korea was able to function on its own, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States would serve as joint trustees. Between the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union opportunistically declared war on Japan, joining the Allied Powers in the Pacific. [2] The surrender of Japan on 14 August 1943 made it necessary to delineate zones in which each ally would receive the Japanese surrender. Two American Army colonels, Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel, used a
National Geographic map to propose a suitable line of demarcation. With no agreeable geographic boundaries, the line agreed upon between the Soviets and Americans was the 38th Parallel. [3] The Americans occupied the area south of the line as the Soviets descended from the north and sealed the border. Unfortunately, President Roosevelt's vision of a free and independent Korea was not to be.
To understand the role and importance that the artillery forward observer
played during the Korean War, you must first understand a few basic facts and
figures about the overall strategy and use of artillery during the war. With
its rolling hills and valleys, high-peaked mountains, large irrigated farming
areas, brutal winters and boiling summers, Korea presented some of the worst conditions the U.S. had to face in the United Nations' first effort to confront the attempted expansion of communism. And, after it was all said and done, even
after fifty-plus years of analyzing the conflict, Korea was, is, and will
forever be known as 'The Artillery War'. Much has been written over the years
about the infantry and Marines who served there, and the battles they fought. No one is suggesting or attempting to take any credit away from their
accomplishments, because when it comes down to it, the foot soldier was the one
who retook and defended what is now the Republic of Korea,
commonly referred to as South Korea.
No other battle during 1952 in the Korean War could match the Battle for White
Horse Mountain, otherwise known as Hill 395, either in ferocity or intensity.
This action goes largely unaccounted for in the annals of American military
history from the Korean War. Why? Mainly because it was a battle between the
Republic of Korea (ROK) Army and the CCF (Chinese Communist Forces). The extent
of involvement by United Nations units was limited to armor units, artillery
battalions, and other support units. The defense of White Horse Mountain was in
the hands of the commander of IX Corps, Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins. IX Corps
was tipped off about an impending attack in the White Horse area when a Chinese officer surrendered to the ROKs in the area of Observation Post 'Roger',
which was located on Hill 284, a small hill mass on the right of White Horse,
and which overlooked a portion of the Chorwon Valley. The American artillery forward observer, 2nd Lt. Paul Braner of the 213th Field Artillery Battalion, brought the prisoner to the attention of IX Corps after he discovered that the
ROKs were torturing the prisoner not far from his bunker.
