Sea Soldiers: Naval Infantry in United States Military History
By Steven Christopher Ippolito
Gallant [Marine Lieutenant] Bush, who mounting the Taffle [taffrail: the stern
bulwarks], sword in hand, and as he exclaimed…Shall I Board Her! Received a
fatal ball on the left cheek bone which passed thro' the back of his head. Thus
fell that brave and illustrious officer, who, when living, was beloved and now
gone, is lamented by all.[1]
Throughout history, powers that did not have a strong navy, even though, they
were impressive on land, usually failed in an all-out war…Sparta wins the
Peloponnesian War only when it builds a navy…Rome wins the Punic War only when
it builds a navy. Germany loses both world wars, in part, because it doesn't
have a navy that can challenge the Allies. Japan is a formidable power…because
of its navy. And when that is gone it fails. The Soviet Union cannot win the
Cold War because it never can really challenge the United States at sea.
Victor Davis Hanson[2]
Introduction
In the history of warfare, the deployment of naval infantry was a
regular feature of battle at sea. For students of military history, any
reference to the soldiers of the sea will likely evoke images of marine
warriors. This assumption would not be incorrect, but it would be incomplete.
Unlike the sailor, the marine was never a regular member of a ship's company,
though he generally found his duty-station aboard the decks of ships.
Close-quarter combat with small arms was a principal duty of marine warriors,
though in the military histories of the United States and other nations, he
might be assigned to man naval guns in combat, to protect ports and naval
depots, too.
The first sea soldiers in the New World were raised in the American colonies
in 1740. The 3,000 marines organized to fight against the Spaniards that year…
became known as 'Gooch's Marines' after…William Gooch,[3] who led them into
action when the British attacked the Spanish naval base at Cartagena in
northern Colombia during April 1741…One of Gooch's Marine officers…was Lawrence
Washington,[4] half-brother of George Washington, the future President of the
United States.[5]
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the marine of any nation might be ordered
to repel enemy boarding parties or to function as a sharpshooter in battle.
Admiral Horatio Nelson was likely killed by a French marine-sniper, on 21
October 1805, at the Battle of Trafalgar.[6] Additionally, the marine might be
ordered ashore and fight in the nature of land-based infantry. On 8 March 1805,
William Eaton led a small detachment of U.S. Marines on a daring march to
attack the city of Derna, in Tripoli, North Africa, assisted by U.S. Marine Lt.
Presley O'Bannon and an ad hoc army of Muslims and Christian
mercenaries and adventurers. Eaton's march of 520 miles through the Desert of
Barca culminated in a furious battle of Derna, "the first decisive American
victory of the Barbary War."[7]
Congress created the U.S. Marine Corps on July 11, 1798. It was a second act
for America's 'soldiers of the sea,' whose training and hierarchy mirrored the
British Marines, crack shipboard and assault troops first organized in 1664.
During the Revolutionary War, Continental Marines—perhaps 50 officers and 2,000
enlisted men altogether—had served on American warships through 1784, but they
disbanded along with the rest of the Continental military establishment. Today,
the Marine Corps observes as its birthday the date of the Continental Marine
Corps' establishment: November 10 1775.[8]
Clearly, the sea soldier concept evokes images of marines. However, in the days
of sail and wooden ships, and even after the Industrial Revolution, the sea
soldier or naval infantryman was less often a marine and more
frequently a sailor or bluejacket, drawn from the regular company of a warship.
Like the marine, the sailor as naval infantryman might be
called upon to defend his vessel from the boarding parties of enemy ships.
Similarly, he could take up small arms, edged weapons, even blunt force
instruments, in order to function as a boarding party, to attack and
seize an enemy vessel. Seaborne infantry duties, therefore, could shift between
sailors or marines, or both services together might see action in joint
amphibious operations. For the present author, sea soldier or
naval
infantry
can refer to sailors, marines, or both together. However,
this paper will advance the idea that a naval infantry composed exclusively of
sailors, far from being an anachronism of warfighting, can and does execute an
effective combat role as sea soldiers within the modern battle-space. The
recent developments within the United States Navy, in response to a new vision
of sailors as naval infantry, bear witness to this insight. To explore the
history of naval infantry in American military history, therefore, and to promote
the utility of a sailor-based naval infantry, this paper will explore both past
and present; it will explore such realities as the genesis of the Navy
Expeditionary Combat Command in 2006, the renewed focus on the use of a brown
water- riverine force in Iraq.
Additionally, this paper will advance the modern deployment of sailors trained
in small arms and infantry tactics, in order to press the fight on land with a
new and virulent enemy. In this new manifestation of naval infantry, the
so-called sand sailors have already assumed combat duties previously
conducted by U.S. Marines, attesting to the new thinking regarding the modern
sea soldier by the U.S. Navy. Contemporaneous with these developments, a new
vocabulary has arises to describe twenty-first century naval infantry, to wit:
the IAs or individual augmentees, sailors operating ashore in
conjunction with other military services. However, to understand the role of
sea soldiers in modern warfighting, in any comprehensive sense, requires
historical understanding and the evidence of military history. The historical
evidence presented here is clear in its findings: naval personnel or sailors
have functioned in an infantry-based capacity in the totality of amphibious
operations and with great success. That they can continue to do so with
excellent results in the post11 September world seems rather clear to the
present author.
Caveat Lector! (Let the reader beware!): The essay that follows will
probe the subject of naval infantry in a somewhat non-linear manner.
It will move forth and back in time, space, and various conflicts, in order to
demonstrate the topic conceptually rather than in any linear fashion.
Past, present, and future, in that progression, therefore, is less important
than the functional reality of the sea soldier, marine or sailor, as one
envisions him rising out of the sea onto a beachhead with power and force in
many eras, many theaters of operation.
Theoretical Conceptualizations of Sea Soldiers—Toward a Modern View
Patrick H. Roth (Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.) writes: "The use of sailors as
infantry (and as artillerymen ashore) was common during the 19th century."[9]
Ron Field writes that that the deployment of "the sea soldiers, or 'marines,'
is as ancient as war at sea."[10] Classical scholar, William Stearns Davis,[11]
writing in 1910, describes the Greek marine or naval infantryman as a defined
member of the crew of a trireme, the primary Greek warship.[12] Today, in an
age when the American military is stretched thin in Iraq and Afghanistan,
fighting sailors mustered for service in land-based combat can and have
rendered excellent service to the overall modern American military situation.
Journalist, Joanne Kimberlin, writing in the Virginian-Pilot, 18
October 2005, describes the new naval infantry as a force of unique
sailor-soldiers, somewhere between Marines and the elite Navy S.E.A.L.s.
Less formidable than SEAL commandos, but more fierce than average swabbies,
the hybrid sailor-soldiers would not elbow out Marines, said Adm. Michael G.
Mullen…
Mullen stressed that the new force would not compete with the Marines but
complement them…
[D]emands in Iraq and Afghanistan have stretched the Marines thin, even as the
Navy's 'brown water' operations are expected to increase missions that call for
close contact with hostile coastlines.[13]
After the attacks on the American homeland, 11 September 2001, the U.S. Navy,
concerned for security for its ships in port, decided to increase the number of
its Masters-at-Arms, to handle such matters. Previously, the designation, Master-at-Arms
was used for a specific job category, a type of naval constable.
The modern naval MA possesses police training, anti-terrorism skills, a light
infantry capability, and a background in force protection.[14] Moreover, in the
wake of this new significance that became attached to the Master of Arms, the
U.S. Navy sought to go further with the creation of what Admiral Michael Mullen
described as the new Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. The NECC was
established on 13 January 2006, and it was headquartered at Naval Amphibious
Base Little Creek, Virginia.
The command will oversee units ranging from bomb disposal crews,
expeditionary logistics groups, and the master-at-arms forces. The NECC will
also provide the 5,000 to 7,000 sailors supporting the Army and Marine Corps in
the Middle East with proper training for these non-traditional jobs
It's time to recognize the need of the young men and women at war on the dirt,
said [Rear Adm Donald] Bullard.
[T]he…NECC will also form a new river combat force to assume maritime security
operations in the Iraqi waterways currently done by the Marine Corps.[15]
This new unit was envisioned as a brown water force. A force of this
kind is tasked with riverine patrol and combat duties, in contrast to a
blue
water
force, which travels and fights on the oceans and seas. The
brown water force created by the NECC patrols can be found in such places as
the Euphrates River in Iraq, where some 79 islands afford the enemy cover for
its personnel and locations to hide weapons caches. Historically,
America's brown water navy was very much in use in the American Revolution,
where small vessels engaged British ships on small bodies of water. The brown
water sailors were in action, again, during the War of 1812, and during the War
Between the States. But its most visible presence would come in the twentieth
century.
Riverine warfare's most notable chapter in history was during the Vietnam
War, when the Navy's River Patrol Force, and Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force
along the Mekong Delta…in South Vietnam.
The 21st century riverine force…conducts maritime security operations along
rivers…to deny the use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack…[and]
the illegal transportation of weapons, people or material.[16]
Official Navy announcements at the time (2005), described this force as
operating as "an infantry component…[T]hese troops would be sailors, not…the
Marine Corps. This new force makes it clear how much the navy and marines have
grown apart."[17] Moreover, the new ECG, like the naval infantry in the days of
sail and wooden ships, would provide "boarding parties for dangerous
interdiction missions."[18] Specially-trained sailors and Masters-at-Arms would
handle such interdiction duties. In terms of numbers, they would be organized
into a force of "only a few thousand strong."[19] Combat duties in Iraq and
Afghanistan have stressed the Army and Marine services in those operational
theaters, and at the time it was conceived, the new naval command was geared to
provide relief for the other services in theater. Additionally, the individual
members within this latest incarnation of bluejacket naval infantry are known
by a modern term, the IAs, or individual augmentees.
The public is…unaware of how involved the U.S. Navy is with the ground war
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, 1,400 sailors are serving with army units
mainly in Iraq…but also in places like Guantanamo Bay. This small army of
sailor augmentees are assigned to fill army support jobs overseas.
In the last seven years over 50,000 U.S. Navy sailors have served as IAs
(individual augmentees) to assist the U.S. Army[.]…[M]ost of the IAs are still
volunteers, [but] many are not.[20]
By November 2005, an estimated 7,000 sailors were assigned to specific theaters
of operation to "guard ports and oil platforms, build roads and buildings and
run customs operations, among other duties."[21] The presence of the Navy in
job functions that have more recently been fulfilled by its Marine and Army
brethren has raised questions, not surprisingly, amongst the other services.
Some of these would seem to be typical turf and control issues, the solution of
which requires considerable diplomatic finesse. Rear Admiral Donald C. Bullard,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operational Readiness and Training for Fleet Forces,
in an important statement on the matter, clearly-stated: "'The Marines are the
naval infantry…Still…we're inextricably linked in this battle space."[22]
Admiral Bullard also said that he expected "a force of more than 700 sailors to
fill three units of river combat forces, with the first unit to become
operational in 2007."[23] However, Bob Work, senior defense analyst at the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, made the point that "the new
structure would not replace the Marines' traditional role."[24] Mr. Work added
that the emergence of the new naval infantry represented "the sea service's
willingness to adapt to changing threats."[25] Similarly, when questioned by
the press about the potential for fallout between Navy and Marines on the issue
of the new infantry, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen on 26
October 2005, "sought to downplay the seeming conflict"[26] At the time,
Admiral Mullen made his remarks, he was standing alongside then, Commandant of
the Marine Corps, General Mike Hagee.
Our naval infantry in this country is standing to my left…When we initiated
this concept in June, there was some confusion about whether the Navy was going
to become some kind of offensive force[.]…That is not the intent at all…This is
not naval infantry done by the Navy…This is a security force. This allows us a
kind…[of] theater security engagement.[27]
In the same diplomatic vein, a Marine spokesperson, Col. Jenny M. Holbert,
offered that "the Atlantic Marine Corps forces fully supported the plan and
would cooperate as the new Navy command develops."[28] But in the opinions of
some, the U.S. Navy "still wanted and needed land forces."[29] Undeniably, the
Marine Corps had grown apart from the Navy, and, in the process, it had managed
to become a de facto fourth military service. By contrast, the new
naval expeditionary command would operate ashore, when needed; in combat
theaters like Iraq, where it would conduct riverine operations. Naval infantry
consisting of sailors also would protect the Navy's land bases in enemy
territory.
[T]he admirals can no longer send in the marines whenever they want to,
[and] NECC provides naval infantry, that will hop to when an admiral needs some
grunts on the ground.[30]
Observers other than historians might have seen these developments as rather
curious. Yet, the issue might have occasioned much less controversy, in the
present author's view, if the relevant history had been openly discussed and
promulgated.
Sea Soldiers in U.S. Military History: Bluejackets and Jarheads
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was not unusual for sailors to
act as "infantry…sometimes providing land based artillery support."[31] In the
nineteenth century, the utilization of boarding parties and the need to repel
such parties was an integral part of naval tactical doctrine. Equally, it was
not uncommon for naval forces to launch amphibious operations, for "landings
and operations ashore were normal."[32] In the history of the American Navy,
the numbers of such operations are impressive in their quantity, and in the
length and breadth of their utilization. On sixty-six occasions, sailors as
naval infantry, were utilized during the nineteenth century[.]"[33]
By 1930, naval infantry had been deployed approximately 136 times in such
theaters of operation as the Caribbean, Central America, and the China Station.
Moreover, it was not until, approximately, 1933 that naval infantry, consisting
primarily as sailors, declined in favor of the Marine Corps, but the swabbies
continued to be used in an infantry capacity as late as the 1970s.[34] The
change came with the organization of the Fleet Marine Forces that took place in
1933.[35] But prior to World War I, the designation of the Marine Corps as the
lead service in "amphibious assault operations,"[36] was already under way.
This development was born of a crisis: naval warfare had changed, and the
Marines no longer seemed to have an adequate mission statement. Despite their
heroic service in years past, and their powerful connection to American
warfighting since 1755, some even questioned their necessity as a distinctive
military service. The turn-of-the-century Marine Corps, therefore, found itself
under considerable pressure from the Navy's General Board and the Office of the
Secretary of the Navy to enter a new phase of service redefinition.[37] In this
atmosphere, the Corps was obliged to embrace a mission, in which its personnel
would help protect "temporary advanced bases."[38]
By 1913, a "permanent temporary advanced base defense force
organization[,]"[39] had come into being within the U.S. Marines Corps. As
early as November 1902, the Marine Corps deployed a battalion for expeditionary
duty aboard the U.S.S. Panther, in order to have naval infantry available for
"expeditionary duties in the Caribbean and Central America. The landing party
mission, however, continued to be in conjunction with Navy bluejackets,"[40]
Roth's observation is that the advanced base defense concept would have been
untenable if the Marines had been unable to seize advanced bases.
In order to insure their success in this new aspect of naval warfighting, the
Marines were obligated to become "organized for field operations."[41] By way
of furthering this goal, the distinguished Marine General John A. Lejeune
became a strong advocate of Marine participation for operational duties ashore
in conjunction with the Fleet. In the years, 1922, 1924, 1925, and 1926, major
landing exercises were conducted with success. However, the circumstances of
the Marine-Navy inter-relationship at this time meant that it was now the
Marine Corps and not the Navy that would take the lead in future amphibious
operations.
The task of securing temporary advanced bases, therefore, coupled with the need
to project power from the decks of its warships, passed from one service to the
other. Overnight, decades of theory and practice, relative to naval infantry,
were jettisoned along with this change.[42] A document issued in 1927,
Joint
Action of the Army and the Navy,
acknowledged that the "'initial
seizure" of advanced bases, "' and for such limited land operations as are
essential to the prosecution of the land campaign[,]'" were now a Marine Corps
responsibility.[43] CNO Admiral William V. Pratt, in 1932, signed-off on
General Lejeune's vision for the future of the Marines. Navy Department Order
241, promulgated in 1933, established the Fleet Marine Force. "By the
mid-1930s…the "Marines had largely and…exclusively become the navy's
infantry…The Navy assumed the role that which is recognizable today—support,
transportation, naval fires, etc."[44] Through a skillful adaptation to
circumstances, the Marines weathered the crisis, to become the dominant actors
in the area of naval infantry. Historically, it would not be the only time the
Corps would demonstrate their resilience in such crises.
Benjamin Armstrong, in his essay, "Reaching Translational Lift: the History of
the Helicopter and Lessons for 21st Century Technology,"[45] has described a
similar crisis that confronted the Marines, subsequent to World War II,
relating to their future mission statement. Post-1945, two powerful elements
dominated the new crisis: the advent of the tactical helicopter, first deployed
by the Army, and the development of atomic weapons, championed by the Air
Force. These powerful military advances left the Marines in something of a
military dilemma, relative to amphibious operations. Lt. Armstrong (U.S. Navy)
writes that the Air Force was little-interested in helicopters, preferring to
focus on atomic weapons as the "great new calling."[46]
The dangers posed by atomic warfare, however, left the Marines wrestling with
the question of how to adapt to the battlefield of the future. In the
helicopter, the Marines saw an answer to their problems. Atomic warfare posed
real problems for success in future amphibious combat. A well-placed atom bomb
could obliterate an entire Marine Division as it fought its way off landing
craft to establish a beachhead, a fact that was not lost on Marine Lt. General
Roy Geiger as he watched the atomic bomb testing at Bikini Atoll. Subsequent to
the atomic testing, Geiger immediately contacted the Commandant of the Marine
Corps with his observations and his very real service concerns. General Geiger
urged that amphibious operations be reviewed and studied in light of the
complications posed by the new atomic weapons.[47] Marine Commandant, General
Alexander Vandegrift promptly convened a board of inquiry into the matter,
headed by Major General Lemuel Shepherd. The inquiry determined that
"dispersion and rapid mobility would be key elements to the atomic
battlefield."[48]
Shepherd's board implemented three recommendations: to test the new aircraft
through the use of an experimental helicopter unit, the establishment of a
program to determine the future of helicopter development, the creation of a
new doctrine for attack helicopters.[49] U.S. Marine rotary wing studies began
in earnest in late 1947, with the establishment of Marine Helicopter
Experimental Squadron One (HMX-1). Igor Sikorsky developed the new squadron's
HO3S-1 aircraft, and the Marines wasted no time in exploring the possibilities
of the new aircraft.
One of the most important techniques of the new doctrine was "vertical
envelopment," which emerged at the time of the Korean War. By December 1955,
the Marines issued a "complete rewrite of the manual governing amphibious
operations[,]" in Landing Force Bulletin 17 (LFB-17), which emphasized a
radically-new idea: heliborne air assault. The advantage of focusing on the
helicopter, was the freedom of action it conferred. Moreover the utilization of
heliborne air assault meant that "'the beach assault can be eliminated
altogether[.]'" This meant that the Marine Corps would now have to be
overhauled. Instead of rising out of the sea to assault a beach, as it trained
to do in the early twentieth century, the Marine naval infantry could descend
from the skies—in short, the USMC had gone airmobile.
Lt. Armstrong writes that by 1960, the Marines had become so advanced in their
new doctrine that they could engage in "multiple battalion-sized assaults from
land or sea," in conjunction with the Navy. The deployment of this doctrine's
foundational tenets was found to be valuable in such operations as the Cuban
Missile Crisis, Operation Sea Gull (Dominican Republic), and in Laos in 1961,
prior to the Vietnam War.[50]
The U.S. Marine Corps was now an airborne naval infantry as well.
Throughout American military history, Marines have repeatedly demonstrated an
extraordinary creativity in the matter of their survivability not only as naval
infantry, but as a viable and independent military service. Ben Armstrong's
essay demonstrates Marine naval infantry's ability to achieve a
highly-satisfactory and inter-dimensional integration of tactics, technology,
and doctrine.
The Marine Corps did not create a helicopter doctrine; instead they
integrated the technology into the greater doctrine of amphibious assault.
Vertical envelopment was a revolutionary step in the overriding vision of power
projection. It was, in the end, part of LFB-17, which was an amphibious
doctrine.[51] (italics mine)
Clearly, the new technology of the helicopter did not preclude the Marines from
maintaining their traditional identity as sea soldiers. Whether they descended
from ships to attack the beaches of the enemy, or flew in from above, their
point of departure remained the amphibious operation; in short, the
Marines remained what they always been: an expression of naval infantry.
American Naval Infantry (1861-1865)
During the War Between the States, naval infantry was much more likely to be
associated with sailors than leathernecks, if for no reason than the Marines
were a much smaller warfighting force in comparison to sailors. At the outset
of hostilities, the Marine Corps suffered from an exodus of its officer corps
of Southern background. Torn in their loyalties between state and nation-state,
many fine officers, in all branches of service, found themselves compelled to
decide between one and the other in the worst war the country has ever endured.
At the time Fort Sumter was bombarded, there were sixty-three officers in the
Corps, twenty of whom either resigned their commissions, or were driven from
service.[52] Unfortunately for the North, these officers were amongst the most
capable in the Corps, and all but one of these served the Confederacy in its
own marine force, the Confederate States' Marine Corps. The Confederate Marines
were established by an act of the Confederate Congress, on 16 March 1861, at
Montgomery, Alabama. Though it never reached its total complement of men,
forty-six officers, and 944 enlisted men, it made its headquarters at Drewry's
Bluff, in Richmond, Virginia. Its one and only Commandant was Colonel Lloyd
Beall, a West Point graduate, who led the Confederate Marines from 1862 till
its surrender with Army of Northern Virginia, 2 April 1865. Like their federal
counterparts, the Southern marines served aboard ships and commerce raiders,
functioned as sharpshooters, manned artillery when required, and led landing
parties. Like the Federal Marines, they engaged with distinction in infantry
engagements, as naval infantry. A detachment of marines from Company A served
aboard the famous C.S.S. Virginia, in its historic engagement against the
U.S.S.
Monitor.
[53]
One of the officers who served with distinction in the U.S. Marines, and
resigned his commission to serve the South was Lt. Israel Greene (1824-1909).
Born in New York, Greene was raised in Wisconsin. He later married a woman from
Virginia, a situation that entered into his decision to serve the South. Lt.
Greene led 86 marines in the counter-attack on the U.S. Armory, Harper's Ferry,
Virginia, after it was seized by the abolitionist John Brown,[55] together with
a group of insurgents. Amongst the captives of John Brown was Col. Lewis
Washington, a great-grand-nephew of George Washington.
In December 1885, Greene, now a civil engineer and a surveyor in Mitchell,
Dakota Territory (South Dakota), wrote an eyewitness account of the Harper's
Ferry raid, "The Capture of John Brown."[55] The rescue operation was under the
command of Lt. Col. Robert E. Lee, who was on leave at the time and about to
depart to Texas to join the U.S. Army's 2nd Cavalry. Of interest is the fact
that throughout the Harper's Ferry operation, Colonel Lee wore civilian
clothes.
Lee was assisted in the mission by the redoubtable Lt. J.E.B.Stuart, U.S. Army,
1st Cavalry, whom, Greene notes, was wearing the hat and plume that he would
become well-known for during the Civil War.[56] Lt. Greene's marines were
fortified by two twelve pound Dahlgren guns (howitzers). Lee, however, hoped to
resolve the seizure of the armory without further violence. At a conference of
officers, prior to the commencement of the operation, Lt. Col. Lee decided to
attempt a negotiation with John Brown as the first action. If Brown was aware
of the howitzers' proximity, he was likely unaware that the weapons had already
been deemed as impractical, given the proximity of hostages to the
insurrectionists. In order to secure the peaceful resolution of the crisis,
therefore, Lt. Stuart was directed to approach John Brown and request that his
surrender and the release of the hostages. Greene would later write that if the
negotiations were unsuccessful, Stuart would signal for the attack to commence
by a pre-arranged signal: he would remove his hat and wave it in Lee's
direction. Predictably, Brown refused; Stuart signaled Lee, and the future
military leader of the Confederacy ordered Lt. Green and twenty-four Marines to
assault the armory.[57] The unfolding combat scene, in all likelihood,
resembled a modern police operation by S.W.A.T. officers: The front door was
breached by blunt-force blows of sledge hammers that included the use of a
ladder.
Immediately, the Corps paymaster, Major Russell and Lt. Greene entered the
armory, where Col. Washington met Greene as he entered the Armory; the captive
promptly pointed out John Brown's hiding place. The actual operational time of
the raid was approximately three minutes duration. The marines killed two of
the insurgents with bayonet thrusts, and one marine, Pvt. Luke Quinn, was
killed, straightaway, the result of a gut shot from Brown's gang. The ensuing
fire in the Armory was described in the press reports of the Richmond
Daily
Dispatch
as "rapid and sharp."[58] In the rapidly unfolding action,
John Brown, armed with a Sharps carbine, was about to shoot Greene, who
immediately counter-attacked. Greene wielded his sword, administering two sword
strikes to Brown: one, an overhead strike; the second, a thrust to the chest
area. In the process, Greene's weapon was damaged.
As he noted in his description of the incident, the leatherneck carried his
light, ceremonial sword, not his service weapon during the action, and the
chest wound caused it to bend. He lost track of the weapon after the Civil War
began, but in the 1880s, he reported that it had been found-- in its bent
state! But he also wrote that at that point in his life, he no longer had any
interest in the weapon at all. In the aftermath of the federal counter-assault
at Harper's Ferry, the Richmond Daily Dispatch furnished an assessment
of the sea soldiers' performance, "'the general feeling being that the marines
had done their part admirably.'"[59] John Brown was subsequently tried and
hanged for his violent actions at Harpers Ferry, and with the beginning of the
War Between the States, Israel Greene, like Lee and Stuart, resigned his
commission and served the South for the duration of the war at the headquarters
of the Confederate Marines in Richmond, Virginia.
Officers like David Dixon Porter and his step-brother remained with the North,
but others like Franklin Buchanan, Raphael Semmes, and Matthew Fontaine Maury
resigned from the U.S. Navy, and served the Confederacy's naval service.[60]
Naval Considerations (1861-1865)
Sea war in the War Between the States did not involve "fleets of line-of-battle
ships…in a Trafalgar-like contest for command of the sea."[61] There were no
great fleets in either Navy, though the North was in a slightly better
position, in terms of numbers of ships in 1861. In addition, America's previous
involvement in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War provided some important
lessons for naval warfare as the Civil War began. Kenneth J. Hagan has written
that both of these earlier conflicts reinforced the lessons of blockade duty.
Through such actions, "a blockading navy could mount stinging amphibious
assaults on the enemy's coastal cities."[62] Nevertheless, a navy that was
dominant at sea could render "coastal defense…difficult if not impossible."[63]
But what was also clear was the need for joint operations. However secure a
naval force was in its dominance of the enemy's coastal waters, a land-based
Army had to invade and occupy "the enemy's politico-economic heart."[64] This
reality was counter-pointed by the lessons of the War of 1812, which taught
that commerce raiders could play an effective role in war. By attacking the
enemy's merchant marine force, the morale of a superior power could be greatly
diminished.[65] Hagan has defined this approach by the French term,
guerre de
course.
[66]
The navy in the era of the sailing frigate was designed to hit and run, to
attack enemy vessels and small warships and flee if faced with a stronger naval
opponent. This strategy, which the French call guerre de course, reached
its apogee in the transitional years between sail and steam, when Captain
Raphael Semmes set a world-class standard for commerce raiding as skipper of
the famed Confederate raider Alabama. [67]
The attack on Fort Sumter, 12 April 1861, was the prelude to the Confederacy's
President Jefferson Davis' decision to utilize guerre de course in his
naval war with the North, and during the War, the Secretary of the Navy for the
Confederate States of America, was Stephen R. Mallory, appointed to his
position by President Davis on 21 February 1861.[68] Under the prodding of
Davis and Mallory, the Confederate States' Congress "authorized the issuance of
letters of marque and reprisal."[69] In so doing, the privateer returned to
American warfighting, after a hiatus from the days of the early United States'
privateer-in-chief, John Paul Jones. According to Hagan:
Privateering was an ancient and honorable way to fight at sea. Armed with
letters of marque and reprisal, audacious crews set to sea in fast and lightly
armed vessels with the sole intention of capturing merchant vessels. They took
their captives into ports, where prize courts legitimized the seizures… [70]
Generally, privateering was regarded as little more than piracy in the Civil
War, in the North, and at the Paris Declaration of 1856, most of the attendees
"declared privateering illegal."[71] And Hagan observes that it was literally
within hours of Davis' decision to resurrect the utilization of privateers that
President Lincoln and Secretary of State, William H. Seward, "responded with
the proclamation of a blockade of the Confederate coast."[72] President Lincoln
also signed orders to increase the size of the Marine Corps, but recruits were
hard to obtain. The Union Marine Corps maintained troop strength of about 3,000
marines, which at the war's end had swollen to about 4,167 officers and men.
One of the most significant utilizations of marine sea soldiers was at the
Battle of Bull Run, or as it rendered in the South, the Battle of the First
Manassas.[73]
On 21 July 1861, Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, authorized the use of
the Marine battalion at the Washington Navy Barracks for service with the Army
of General Irwin McDowell. The Marines were attached to Colonel Andrew
Porter's, 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, under the command of such officers as
Major John G. Reynolds and Captain Jacob Zeilin. In orders that reflect the fog
of war, the Marines were directed to follow behind (on foot) an all-mounted
Army unit, Captain Charles Griffin's Battery D, 5th U.S. Artillery. Improbably,
and in order to keep up with the horse soldiers, the Marines had to move on the
double quick
for several hours! Nevertheless, the Marines demonstrated
consummate professionalism as soon as the shooting started.
Porter's brigade formed part of the Federal right wing, and it was "deployed to
cross Bull Run, at Sudley Springs, in order to deliver a flank attack on
Confederate positions northwest of Manassas."[74] Following on foot, as noted,
it was with some difficulty, but undeniable tenacity, that the Marines
eventually caught up with Griffin's artillery. Presently, as the battle
unfolded, and the naval infantry advanced behind the guns, they soon
encountered an infantry unit in blue uniforms, an indication of friendly
troops. In fact, they were a Confederate force, the 33rd Virginia Regiment, and
in the resulting confusion, the Northern artillery was eventually overcome. The
sea soldiers fell back in good order throughout, engaging in a rear guard
action till relieved by the 71st New York State Militia. Losses, however, were
significant: eight marines killed, eight wounded; and eighteen missing.[75]
In 1861, Flag Officer Samuel F. DuPont began to utilize joint operations that
foreshadowed the manner of deployment for the future sea soldier. In late
October, DuPont assembled an armada of 50 ships, 13,000 Army troops, and the
Marine Battalion from Washington, D.C. By November, the great force had
increased to seventy-seven ships, including eleven deep-draft warships, various
gunboats, thirty transport vessels with 16,000 U.S. Army troops. In that same
month, Admiral DuPont led his force in an attack on Port Royal Sound, located
between Charleston, South Carolina and Savannah, Georgia. The transports, being
anchored safely out of sight, DuPont raked two earthen forts on the Sound with
cannon fire from the 46 gun frigate Wabash. Army and Marine forces
landed in a joint amphibious operation with no resistance. This amphibious
operation set a military precedent, it seems, for Hagan: "The operation set the
pattern for Atlantic and Gulf Coast operations, and for the rest of the war,
Port Royal served as a major base of operations for the blockading fleet."[76]
A severe November storm derailed the further combat deployment of this
impressive force, unfortunately. But this setback was greatly compounded by an
unexpected Revolution in Military Affairs, to wit: the C.S.S. Virginia,
an ironclad unique in naval warfare of the time, and its murderous attack upon
the Union blockade vessel the U.S.S. Cumberland.
Secretary Mallory, doubtless impressed by the ingeniously-destructive power of
DuPont's combined force, resolved to meet the blockade with some ingenuity of
his own. His naval strategy began with the raising and refloating of a Union
vessel, a 40 gun steam frigate Merrimack. The ship had been scuttled
by the Union when they withdrew from the Norfolk Navy Yard. Sunk or not,
Mallory saw potential in the Merrimack as a means of destroying the
blockade.
The masts and superstructure of the original ship were replaced by a sloped
iron casemate to protect the engines and crew…and she was rechristened the
C.S.S.
Virginia
on 17 February 1862. The new warship carried eleven guns and
an iron ram mounted on the bow below the water's surface. Mallory hoped that
the Virginia would be able to destroy the Union's wooden blockaders or
drive them from the mouth of Chesapeake Bay[.]" [77]
By March 1862, the Virginia was armed and ready. On 8 March, it sailed
out to confront the U.S.S. Cumberland with painful results for the
Union Navy and the Marine naval infantry. At the time of the Confederate
vessel's attack, the Marines were standing in formation on the foredeck, and
the Virginia's artillery barrage killed fourteen of Captain Charles Heywood's
forty-six Marines. The Cumberland was sunk in the action, and the Virginia,
now virtually-unchallenged, rampaged through the federal formation forcing
three vessels aground, and even managed to capture the U.S.S. Congress.
The Confederate sea beast withdrew, at length, but it returned the next day,
expecting to destroy the remaining federal blockade. However, naval military
history would be made this time when the Confederate ironclad found, not ships
of wood, but a strange-looking, ironclad vessel, the U.S.S. Monitor. The
story of the Monitor begins with the convocation of a special Ironclad
Board by Mallory's Federal counterpart, Gideon Welles. Aided by Gustavus Fox,
Welles had learned of Mallory's intention to refit and redeploy the Merrimack
as an ironclad warship. Alert to the destructive potential of the Confederate
intentions, Welles called for designs to neutralize what appeared to him to be
a new and dangerous weapon system. One of these designs was submitted by
Swedish naval architect, and it was radically-different from anything in use at
the time. It was to be called the Monitor. And of the three vessels
proposed to Welles' Ironclad Board, only "the Monitor design…was truly
revolutionary."[78]
Ericsson brought the vessel to operational readiness life during a construction
period that lasted for a remarkably short period of one hundred days.
Commissioned on 25 February 1862, the Monitor had a single turret which
sheltered two 11-inch guns, both Dahlgren smoothbore cannon. Iron plating
protected the vessel from enemy fire, and her deck, too, was armored. Sitting
low in the water—Hagan observes that "she drew only 12 feet[,]" and her
"extremely low silhouette" rendered her a difficult target for enemy cannon.
"In her totality—steam, turret, and armor—she has been seen as 'a prototype for
the future battleship navies of the world[.]'"[79] Almost thirty years later,
the U.S.S. Oregon (1890) would closely resemble the Monitor in its use
of turrets and a low-lying silhouette. The difference, however, was the Monitor
was not designed for use on the high seas. Her rather low freeboard and shallow
draft qualified her to function as "a coastal gunboat, intended to fight in the
bays and river mouths of the divided Republic."[80]
Commanded by Lieutenant John L. Worden, the Monitor was towed to Hampton Roads,
arriving on 8 March 1862. In Welles' haste to get the Monitor into action,
there was no time for the usual sea trials, nor proper training for a crew in
an ironclad vessel, or even basic gunnery practice. On the day she arrived, the
Virginia
had already dispatched the Cumberland. The 32 gun
sloop had been attacked by the Virginia's underwater ram and
ultimately destroyed. Casualties were significant amongst the marines on board
as well. Next, the Virginia's captain, Franklin Buchanan, raked the 52 gun Congress
with cannon fire, taking her prisoner, too. As Hagan observes: "the United
States could not encircle the Confederacy with a wooden fence; the Virginia
was on the verge of realizing Stephen Mallory's latest dream for her."[81]
All that changed when the Monitor arrived on the scene. On 9 March 1862, the Monitor
sailed into Hampton Roads, and the battle between she and the C.S.S. Virginia
began in earnest. As sea battles go, this four hour clash was inconclusive, in
that, neither vessel was damaged critically. However, each vessel "partially
achieved its strategic aim." The Virginia was neutralized from
destroying the Union blockade; the Union Navy, on the other hand, was prevented
from attacking Norfolk or maneuvering on the James River, so long as the Virginia
was still active. What was also clear to all observers was the realization that
an era in naval warfare was over.[82] Moreover, the experience of the
C.S.S.
Virginia
is representative of "the Confederacy's doomed attempt to
disrupt the Union blockade."[83]
During the Civil War, the Confederacy utilized a way of fighting at sea that
was somewhat traditional: "coastal defense and commerce raiding."[84] A series
of forts in the South that were constructed on bluffs that overhung the harbors
and channels could not be completely overcome by the Union until the latter
days of the War. What was not successful in the coastal defense plan was the
"naval component of coastal defense[.]"[85] In the area of mines and blockade
runners, the South had some success. Matthew Fontaine Maury, who headed the
Confederate Submarine Battery Service, constructed enough mines to destroy
thirty-one Union blockade vessels.[86] These successes, aside, by 1864, the
Confederate naval threat was over.
The Civil War had witnessed an anomaly of offensive naval operations as part
of a campaign of conquest. The future promised to resemble a more typical past,
wherein the United States Navy deployed its active vessels on distant station
and maintained a reserve fleet…should war with a European power seem
imminent.[87]
Bluejacket Naval Infantry—Post-1865
Naval infantry, composed of sailors, were highly-visible in the post-war
period. Infantry composed of sailors served with distinction in the Philippine
Insurrection (1899-1902). The bluejacket sea soldiers were utilized in such
activities as force protection, election security, and "guard duty to
large-scale major combat operations against regular Army forces."[88] In the
last decade of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Navy was "transformed…[by a
blend of] imperialism…[and] enthusiasm for capital ships."[89] These political
realities led to the use of naval infantry in various places. One such place
was Hawaii, and the annexation of that land in the administration of President
Benjamin Harrison.
Harrison appointed John L. Stevens, an ally of Secretary of State James G.
Blaine, as U.S. Minister Plenipotentiary to Queen Liliuokalani in January 1891,
a time of political and economic intrigue, and unabashed American imperialism.
Minister Stevens played no small role in the overthrow of the Hawaiian
government, an affair in which. American planters were complicit with Stevens
(conspiracy, perhaps, is a better word), and the ambassador "honored their
request for naval intervention the moment they seized power in Hawaii."[90] The
U.S.S. Boston,
flagship of the Pacific Squadron, arrived at Honolulu
in time for the commencement of the American-led revolt, 16 January 1893.
Captain Gilbert C. Wiltse landed a force of naval infantry at the request of
Minister Stevens, and in his subsequent report to Secretary of the Navy Tracy,
he reported:
"'At 4:30 p.m. landed force in accordance with the request of U.S. Minister
Plenipotentiary. Tuesday afternoon the Provisional Government was established,
the Queen dethroned, without loss of life.'"[91]
Regarding this incident, Hagan observes: "Some 164 bluejackets and marines were
brandishing Gatling funs and rifles outside the royal palace, and the
Secretary, subsequently, did not question Wiltse's action."[92] Two years
earlier, in 1891, the Navy utilized and taught a tactical infantry doctrine
that continued to be "refined and updated…until 1965."[93] Interestingly, the
Navy's infantry tactics at this time were in line with the U.S. Army tactical
doctrine and not the Marine Corps.
The departure from the tactics of their Marine cousins was due to the Navy's
desire for "inter-service interoperability."[94] Moreover, as early as 1852,
the Naval Regulations issued in that year, required commanding officers to
train specific numbers of men in naval infantry-small-arms capability. This was
a true naval infantry, as Roth points out, "'exclusive of marines[.]'"[95] The
numbers of men slated to be trained as naval infantry depended upon the size of
the ships to which they were assigned. On a ship with 44 guns, 75 sailors were
assigned for naval infantry purposes. Naval regulations required ships with 36
guns to assign60 men, and so on, down to the smallest vessels which were
required to assign 20 men. All the small arms of the nineteenth century
utilized by the American military: handguns, carbines, swords, muskets, were
utilized by naval infantry. The 1852 regulations also required that "'boat
crews" had to be trained to lead attacks "'either by land or water[.]"[96]
Graduates of the Naval Academy all studied infantry tactics in the Freshman and
Sophmore Years. And "specialized landing party ordnance" evolved to serve as a
boat gun and a land-based field piece. Commander John Dahlgren developed a
twelve pound gun in 1850, which could be drawn by a field carriage.
In the American Civil War, Dahlgren, who commanded the South Atlantic
Blockading Squadron, regularly ordered that "boat artillery and sailor infantry
be 'landed occasionally for practice.'"[97] The end of the Civil War led to
changes in the American military. In the maritime service, "a strong current of
reform began to take hold in the Navy." But as Roth points out, this spirit of
reform "did not neglect operation by sailors ashore as infantry, and as
artillerymen."[98] In March 1874, in Key West, the North Atlantic Squadron
conducted a large-scale exercise, involving 2,700 men. Five battalions (a naval
brigade) of naval infantry (sailors), and one battalion of naval infantry
(artillery) engaged in an amphibious landing.
In August 1884, Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, then, in temporary command of the
North Atlantic Squadron, commenced an amphibious landing in Gardiner's Island,
New York. In this exercise, a brigade of two infantry battalions, one of which
was exclusively composed of sailors, artillery and supporting elements
rehearsed landing operations.[99] In the years, 1888, 1894, and 1895, while
Admiral Luce was now President of the Naval War College, and in command of the
North Atlantic Squadron, he conducted naval infantry landings and war games at
Coddington Point, in Newport, Rhode Island. These exercises utilized ten
companies of sailors.
Landing exercises involving sailors as the primary source of infantry were
in the latter part of the 19th century, conducted on a schedule comparable to
exercises involving fleet tactics. Infantry tactics were considered very
important and the consensus was that they, like fleet tactics, improved with
practical exercise.[100]
In the late nineteenth century, several professional articles were written
which discussed the "ongoing intellectual debate[,]" with respect to naval
infantry. Lieutenant T.B.M. Mason wrote "On the Employment of Boat Guns as
Light artillery for Landing Parties," in 1879. Mason's argument was that
sailors should be "'efficient infantry and artillerymen.'" In 1880, Lieutenant
John C. Soley wrote a paper, "The Naval Brigade," detailing the history of
landing parties, and it served as a manual for landing parties, too. Lt.
Soley's paper was the catalyst for a Naval Institute's prize essay contest in
1887, dealing with the same topic.
Lieutenant C.T. Hutchins was the winner of this contest. His essay, "The Naval
Brigade: Its Organization, Equipment, and Tactics," was a powerful piece of
naval writing, and it "foreshadowed the Navy's Landing Party Manuals of the
20th century."[101] The debate that ensued in the 1880s amongst naval theorists
concerned the nature of the threats sea soldiers would have to face. The
argument ranged from Ensign William Ledyard Rogers' view that naval infantry
would likely face the best warfighters that an enemy could muster. Others, like
Lieutenant William F. Fullam, believed that at best naval brigades and
battalions would likely be involved in street battles involving mobs, gangs, or
in the modern parlance, street insurgencies, which have become common
in the American military consciousness, post-11 September. In effect, Fullam's
argument served to "theoretically degrade the usefulness of sailors as
infantry." And the question remained as to the nature of the enemies and
battles a bluejacket naval infantry should be trained to encounter.[102]
Simultaneously, a movement began, which was championed by Lt. Fullam, to remove
"the marine ship guard from naval vessels."
An 1889 board of inquiry chaired by Commodore James Greer, at the behest of the
Secretary of the Navy, concurred with this view, but the Secretary refused to
implement this suggestion. Fullam, however, was not deterred, and he continued
to lobby for the removal of marines from warships until 1908. In that year,
President Theodore Roosevelt became involved in the issue, and he agreed with
Fullam. The president issued Executive Order 969, which redefined the duties of
the Marine Corps. The order removed the marines from shipboard; they could no
longer guard vessels or have any on-board functions. It was a short-lived
order, however, in that, the U.S. Congress overturned Roosevelt's directive.
Vera Cruz—1914---Naval Infantry Watershed
Notwithstanding the outcome of these events, Roth's assessment is central to
the argument of this paper: "[I]t is quite clear that the professional Navy
considered sailors to have a mission as infantrymen and that these bluejackets,
with proper organization and training, [could] be as proficient as
marines."[103] But, ironically, it was subsequent to one of the combined sailor
and marine naval infantry's finest combat hours that the role of sailors as
infantry was destined to undergo alteration. The battle occurred in Mexico,
over a two day period, 21 and 22 April 1914. Fifty-six Medals of Honor were
awarded to sailors and marines who fought as naval infantry in that campaign.
If there was any doubt that sailors could function effectively as infantry, all
that was wiped away by the almost common instances of great valor of
bluejackets and marines fighting on land.[104] A brigade of 2,500
bluejacket naval infantry landed at the city in combination of 1.300
marines.[105]
The political machinations that played out in the background of the Vera Cruz
landing, derived, in part, from the pronounced bellicosity of certain
high-ranking individuals in the American government and the military: the
Army's General Leonard Wood, the Navy's Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, and,
perhaps, most significantly, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Roosevelt, who served under President Woodrow Wilson, "capitalized
on a stint as acting secretary of the navy to stir up war sentiment."[106] He
was not as successful in this as he might have been, for Wilson and Secretary
of the Navy Daniels were able to restrain him. However, the Roosevelt approach
had better results in 1914 when Wilson became disenchanted with conditions in
Mexico, under General Victoriano Huerta. To undermine Huerta, Wilson sent
shipments of arms to the rebel, Venustiano Carranza.
In addition, Wilson dispatched American warships off Vera Cruz and Tampico, two
important Mexican Gulf port cities.[107] The crisis was heightened on 9 April
1914, when eight American sailors were arrested by Mexican authorities as the
Americans loaded supplies on a whaleboat at Tampico. The matter was quickly
resolved when the local Mexican commander apologized, but almost immediately he
upset the Americans once more when he refused to salute the American flag with
twenty-one guns. Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo demanded that the salute be given,
and President Wilson seconded Mayo's demand. Roosevelt was ordered to return to
Washington from a tour of Pacific Coast installations, after Wilson requested
Congressional authorization "to intervene in force." Roosevelt, apparently, was
greatly pleased by this militant development, and he even told a reporter that
the Tampico incident signaled war. War didn't come, but violence did.[108]
The escalation of the crisis occurred when a German steamer, bound for
President Huerta, arrived at Vera Cruz, was packed with machine guns and
ammunition for the Mexican cause. Wilson ordered the ship's cargo interdicted
by seizure of the customs house, and between 21-22 April, six American
battleships landed at Vera Cruz, where the combined bluejacket naval infantry
and marines disembarked. The street battles that ensued were rather bloody. The
city was taken, but seventeen Americans were killed, and about 126 Mexicans
died in the violence.[109] The Vera Cruz operation highlights two critical
problems for any deployment of naval infantry. For Roth, these problems are
tactics and sustainability. Tactically, the naval infantry suffered when the
Second Seaman Regiment assaulted the Mexican Navy Academy. The naval infantry
assaulted the location with the "massed infantry tactics of 1891 and
earlier."[110]
When these proved a little dangerous, the "bluejackets…had to adopt improvised
small unit tactics to cope with the street fighting."[111] The second issue,
sustainability, would prove more difficult. From the days of wood and sail,
landing party sustainability was recognized to be a genuine problem. Sailors in
the pre-Industrial Revolution were interchangeable, in terms of shipboard
duties. But in the Age of Steam, the increasing-complexity of gun systems and
mechanical systems turned many sailors into specialists. Such men
could not be spared for amphibious naval infantry operations. As a consequence,
it was after Vera Cruz that "very large-scale fleet bluejacket landings did not
occur. Effective use of the landing party was constrained, but not
eliminated."[112] Bluejacket naval infantry survived Vera Cruz, but as it had
all along, when operating ashore, the naval infantry was organized according to
U.S. Army principles.
The 1918 Landing Force Manual stated that "'when operating on
shore…the landing force…carries out the same tactics, and in the same manner,
as would a similar force from the U.S. Army under the same conditions."[113]
The 1918 Manual employed the same Army designations for "units and sub-units
(squad, platoon, etc.)." And in 1927, the Landing Force Manual was
updated to maintain parity with the U.S. Army "regulations for infantry,
machine-gun units, and combat principles."[114] The reasons for such close
Navy-Army cooperation at this time may have been fueled by the "decade and a
half effort to remove marines from ships. This may have been a key underlying
factor."[115] Whatever the reason, it was not long afterwards, that the
Marines, prompted by a military need to remain viable as a fighting force,
increased in size and gradually assumed control of amphibious operations.
However, as Roth points out, the bluejacket naval infantry remained in
existence.
Bluejacket infantry…continued to have a role, albeit much more minor than it
had been decades earlier. In China, infantry operations ashore by sailors
continued as an integral part of the Asiatic fleet's operations along the
Yangtze River even though the marines had taken over the bulk of activity.[116]
Naval infantry continued to be used in World War II, though their activity was
limited. Admiral Halsey, commander of the Third Fleet, organized sailors "as
three battalions of infantry…[at] the occupation of Yokosuka Naval Base at the
end of world War II. Samuel Eliot Morison suggests that the sailor battalions
were necessary because not enough marines were available to the Third
Fleet."[117] Roth writes that the last known instance of a naval ship sending a
landing party was within the continental United States. This was "the formation
of a naval battalion from the landing parties of ships in port Long Beach,
California in connection with the 1965 Watts riots."[118]
Nevertheless, as late as 1965, "each ship, division, force and fleet was
required to 'maintain a permanently organized naval landing party consisting of
headquarters, rifle, machine gun, and other units as prescribed by the force or
fleet commander.'"[119] The matter would seem to have ended there. Sailors
traditionally played infantry roles, but time and military necessity might seem
to have moved on, and the age of the bluejacket disembarking from the sea and
the decks of ships to fight as land warriors in land-based operations would
seem to be no more. All that changed, of course, when on 11 September 2001, a
new kind of enemy, Al Qaeda saw fit to invade American territory and
murder American civilians and non-combatants. This signal event in American
political and military history prompted circumstances in which Army and Marine
units fighting on land, and taxed to the maximum, would find relief to some
extent by a renaissance in naval thinking with respect to land war. Here,
bluejackets would rediscover a function that in times past was as
natural as unfurling a sail, or the singing of sea chanteys. Like the
marine, the bluejcket naval infantryman represents a venerable, time-tested,
battle-hardened warfighting function. In the view of the present author, it is
a function that never should have gone too far away. And having proven its
worth, then and now, it should be deployed and utilized to the full, never to
go away again!
Conclusion
This paper has examined the utilization of Naval Infantry in American military
history. It has attempted to make a case for the validity of the sea soldier,
past and present. Consisting of both marines and sailors, sea soldiers date
back to ancient times, and there has been little question, at any time, of
their effectiveness in combat.
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Marines were a
relatively small force, and there were greater numbers of sailors in naval
infantry functions than marines. Therefore, it made sense that bluejackets
would comprise most of the naval infantrymen until the Marines expanded in size
in the early twentieth century.
In the Philippines, in Samoa, in Hawaii, in the Boxer Rebellions in China, and
most significantly, perhaps, in Vera Cruz in 1914, bluejacket naval infantry
was very much in evidence in the combat theaters of the American experience.
However, it may have been perceptible to discerning observers that the coming
of the Industrial Revolution might lead to changes in the universe of naval
infantry. The transition to ironclad, steam powered vessels might have been the
best clue that the role of the fighting sailor was about to become a bit more
complex that it had been in the age of wooden ships and sail.
The new technology and weapons' systems of the new battle fleet necessitated
changes that required greater specialization in the individual duties that
sailors might be called upon to perform. As the nineteenth century gave way to
the twentieth, the Marines were obligated to redefine their mission statement.
Within the first two decades of the new century, the Marine Corps had begun to
increase in size, and by focusing on the task of seizing advanced amphibious
bases, the movement toward transitioning the bulk of naval infantry duties had
begun to move inexorably from bluejackets to leathernecks. By the third decade
of the century, the Naval Service saw an organization of the Fleet Marine
Force, with official recognition by the Department of the Navy that the Marines
would assume the lead role in amphibious operations.
The use of sailors in naval infantry functions was still an accepted fact of
naval war, and would continue to remain so until the 1970s, but the handwriting
was on the wall, as it were. The primary naval infantry, beginning in the early
twentieth century, was the U.S. Marine Corps. And as the Japanese military
learned first hand in World War II's Pacific Theater, the Corps exhibited
devastating skill and ability in this capacity. Yet, it cannot be denied that
sailors, too, had been highly-effective in centuries past, and can still play a
role in modern warfighting in that capacity, a point the present author has
striven to articulate. Nevertheless, the reality that the Marines were now the
Naval Infantry was apparent in their successful mastery of the complexities of
amphibious operations in World War II, in the Pacific Theater. No sooner had
they demonstrated their extraordinary competence in this regard, however, that
the rules of the game seemed to change, once again, and not in the
leathernecks' favor. The change was occasioned by the development of the atom
bomb. A bomb of such destructive force could easily destroy a division of naval
infantry in an amphibious operation, and with some sense of alarm, the Marine
chiefs sought to ameliorate the problem confronting them. The answer, of
course, was the helicopter.
Benjamin Armstrong's essay has demonstrated that the Marine Corps once again
mastered the helicopter in much the same way that Mongols mastered the horse
and the Asian steppe. It was this service that developed the heliborne assault,
which then proceeded to teach everyone else. As the Vietnam War became a
historical memory, the Marines continued to dominate the naval infantry
function. But a real movement towards returning some naval infantry functions
to brigades and battalions of sailors was, and is, a development that
follows the martial storyline of 11 September 2001.
The reason was necessity: sailors who mastered the infantry function, a
traditional role for sailors, the Marine Corps, notwithstanding, were needed to
provide relief to Army and Marine units that were stretched thin in multiple
theaters of operation. It was this development that led to the deployment of
the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, a brown water force in 2005, and the
return of the sailor as naval infantryman in the new guise of the individual
augmentee, and the sand sailor. And if the past is prologue to the future,
relative to the sea soldier, the present author sees no advantage in attempting
to duplicate the current Marine Corps function through a parallel bluejacket
naval infantry. To obtain the requisite numbers of personnel involved in such
an attempt would be impractical, given the reality of our all volunteer
military force.
But given the traditional role of sailors in land warfare, and the good service
they rendered the nation in years past, it is both prudent and wise, in the
view of the present author, to return some portion of the U.S. Navy to one of
its traditional combat roles: the deployment of the bluejacket naval
infantryman. Our Marine Corps, too, is an authentic naval infantry, and so it
should remain. They have earned the right to this role through the
circumstances of military history, though the primary combatants for
warfighting of this type, traditionally, have been sailors. The twists and
turns of history aside, the Marines will almost certainly continue to be the
primary agent of projected naval power in amphibious land-based operations.
This is as it should be, but it is hardly the end of the story. The United
States' combined security forces, military, police agencies, and an engaged
citizenry, continue to be engaged in one of the most complex security
situations ever to challenge its existence. Given this reality, sailors as
naval infantry, operating in the battlespaces of a brave new world, would seem
to be a most-welcome development.
Ideally, this function would be a volunteer mission, given the need for
specialization in an increasingly-complex Navy. In the bluejacket sea soldier,
one encounters the return of a venerable and traditional combat actor in modern
battle dress, a warfighter whose contribution to the prosecution of America's
conflicts is undeniable. The present author applauds the Navy's return to the
use of the sailor as sea soldier, whether he is called, sand sailor, individual
augmentee, or any other such name. The labels are immaterial. Not so, the
mission. What is important is that we champion the return of the sailor as sea
soldier and naval infantryman within the modern battlespace.
The exigencies of modern war have focused attention on the combat roles of
sailors and marines; they have also resulted in a recollection of the history
of the American naval past, the sailor as sea soldier. Today's bluejacket has
been allowed to reclaim certain traditional aspects of his naval mission and
purpose in the riverine war of Iraq and elsewhere. The goal is one well known
to our maritime services, or any military service: the defense of the homeland,
and an idea called America!
Appendix: A Partial List of Medal of Honor Recipients: (Vera Cruz) 21-22 April
1914
ANDERSON, EDWIN A.
Rank and organization: Captain, U.S. Navy. Born: 16 July 1860, Wilmington N.C.
Accredited to North Carolina. G.O. No: 177, 4 December 1915. Other Navy award:
Distinguished Service Medal. Citation: For extraordinary heroism in battle,
engagement of Vera Cruz, 22 April 1914, in command of the 2nd Seaman Regiment.
Marching his regiment across the open space in front of the Naval Academy and
other buldings, Capt.
Anderson unexpectedly met a heavy fire from riflemen, machineguns and 1
pounders, which caused part of his command to break and fall back, many
casualties occurring amongst them at the time. His indifference to the heavy
fire, to which he himself was exposed at the head of his regiment, showed him
to be fearless and courageous in battle.
BUTLER, SMEDLEY DARLINGTON (First Award)
Rank and organization: Major, U.S. Marine corps. Born 30 July 1881, West
Chester, Pa. Appointed from Pennsylvania. G.O. No. 177, 4 December 1915. Other
Navy awards: Second Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Medal. Citation: For
distinguished conduct in battle, engagement of Vera Cruz, 22 April 1914. Maj.
Butler was eminent and conspicuous in command of his battalion. He exhibited
courage and skill in leading his men through the action of the 22d and in the
final occupation of the city.
CREGAN, GEORGE
Rank and organization: Coxswain, U.S. Navy. Place and date: On board the U.S.S.
Florida, at Vera Cruz Mexico, 21 April 1914. Entered service at: New York. Born
11 December 1885, New York, NY. G.O. No. 101 15 June 1914. Citation: On board
the U.S.S. Florida, for extraordinary heroism in the line of his profession
during the seizure of Vera Cruz, Mexico, 21 April 1914. Cregan was ashore when
he volunteered for an assault detail under Ens. George Maus Lowry on the Vera
Cruz Customshouse under enemy fire both in the alley between the customhouse
and warehouse and the assault over objective's walls. During the move up the
alley, he tended a wounded comrade, J.F. Schumaker, holding a compress with one
hand and firing with the other.
NEVILLE WENDELL CUSHING
Rank and organization: Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine corps. Born 12 May 1870,
Portsmouth, Va. Appointed from: Virginia. G.O. No.: 177, 4 December 1915. Other
Navy award: Distinguished Service Medal. Citation: For distinguished conduct in
battle engagements of Vera Cruz 21 and 22 April 1914. In command of the 2nd
Regiment of Marines, Lt. Col. Neville…was almost continually under fire from
soon after landing…His duties required him to be a points of great danger in
directing his officers and men, and he exhibited conspicuous courage, coolness,
and skill in his conduct…His responsibilities were great and he met them in a
matter worthy of commendation.
Footnotes
[1]. Mark Hilliard, "Clothing for Five Years,"
http://www.1812usmarines.org/Clothing%20for%20Five%20Years%20(updated%207.24.06)%20v2%20ms.doc
(accessed 6 June 2008).
[2]. "Interview with Victor Davis Hanson: 'We're Removing Saddam Husein,'
The
Naval Institute Proceedings
(March 2003),
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_Interview_0303,00.html (accessed
6 June 2008).
[3]. Sir William Gooch, born in Yarmouth, England, 21 October 1681, died in
London, 17 December 1751. In 1727, he succeeded Sir Hugh Drysdale as Governor
of Virginia. In 1740, he joined the Admiral Edward Vernon (1684-1757), a
one-time member of Parliament, in an attack on Cartagena, Colombia, during the
War of Jenkins Ear (The War of the Austrian Succession), between Spain and
England.. His connection with the subsequent United States Marine Corps, though
not a direct line of descent, is well-established. See
http://www.famousamericans.net/sirwilliamgooch/
[4]. Lawrence Washington (1718-1752) was the half-brother of George Washington,
and fourteen years the future President's senior. A prominent Virginia
landowner, Lawrence served under Admiral Edward Vernon (1684-1757). He saw
action in the Cartagena operation, and, in 1741, he landed with Vernon at
Guantanamo, Cuba, during the War of the Austrian Succession (The War of Jenkins
Ear). The estate of the Washington family, Mount Vernon, was named in honor of
Admiral Edward Vernon.
[5]. Ron Field, Marine: U.S. Marine Corps Heroes of the Pacific War (London:
Publishing News Ltd., 1999), 4
[6]. Leigh Kimmel, "Lord Nelson and Sea Power," 1998,
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/3682/nelsonsea.html (accessed 28 April 2008),
Lord Nelson (born 29 September 1758, was killed in one of the most ferocious
sea battles ever fought in the West, Trafalgar. In the course of the battle,
Nelson, in command of the H.M.S. Redoubtable , attacked the Admiral
Pierre Villeneuve's flag ship, Bucentaure. In the bloody fighting that ensued,
Nelson was, in all likelihood, killed by a French marine-sniper. He died at
1630 hours that day, 21 October 1805, together with 1500 of his own men and a
great many French casualties. Interestingly, for naval infantry history
devotees, Nelson was an early advocate of amphibious operations, which were
complicated at the time by the lack of appropriate transport boat technology.
The oar-powered vessels could not stand up to rough seas, and complicated
operations that would require later generations of motorized vessels; Nelson's
tactical vision was sound, but it clearly was ahead of its time.
[7]. Wheelan, Ibid., 285.
[8]. Joseph Wheelan, Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror 1801-1805
(New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003), 83.
[9]. Patrick H. Roth (Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.), "Sailors as Infantry in the
U.S. Navy," (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy-Naval Historical Center,
October, 2005): http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/naval_infantry.htm
[10]. Field, Ibid., 4.
[11]. William Stearns Davis, "The Officers and Crew of a Trireme," in Chapter
14, Section 110, A Day in Old Athens, 1910,
http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bi/bi_text_wsd_sec110.htm
[12]. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1993), 255. Keegan describes the trireme as the chief instrument of Athenian
naval strategy. It was likely developed by the Phonecians on the Syrian coast
in the first millennium B.C. 120 feet long, and fifteen feet wide, the trireme
was a heavy vessel. It had an armored beak which was often used a ramming
weapon. The term trireme reflected the triple row of sailors superimposed in
rank on either side of the ship. With respect to its personnel, Keegan says:
"Athens recruited its sailors from a lower census class than that of the
hoplites, who supplied the galley with fighting marines. In close action, the
oarsmen might join in the fight which, as ship locked with ship, took the form
of a body-to-body rather than hull-against-hull struggle for advantage." (p.
255)
[13]. Joanne Kimberlin, "Navy Considers Sailors Trained for Close Quarters
Assault," Virginian-Pilot, 18 October
2005,http://content.hamptonroads.com/story/cfm?story=93850%ran=185104 (accessed
11 December 2007).
[14]. Strategy Page: News as History, 11 December 2007,
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htamph/articles/20050928.aspx
[15]. Katrina Scampini, "Navy Expeditionary Command Stands Up," Navy News.mil;
U.S. Navy, Fleet Public Affairs Center Atlantic (14 January 2006),
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=21962
[16]. "Fleet Week NYC 2008,
http://www.cnrma.navy.mil/fleetweek/NECC%20Fleet%20Displays.pdf (accessed 3
June 2008).
[17]. "USN Creates a New Marine Corps," The Free Republic, 20 July 2005, 1,
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1447067/posts
[18]. Free Republic, Ibid., 1.
[19]. Free Republic, Ibid., 1
[20]. "Sailor in the Sand Box," Strategy Page (22 January 2008),
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htamph/articles/20080122.aspx (accessed 3 June
2008).
[21]. Louis Hansen, "Realignment Puts Navy's Land Forces Under One Command,"
The Virginia Pilot, 5 November
2005,http://content.hamptonroads.com/story/cfm?story=94847&ran=10048
[22]. Hansen, Ibid., 1.
[23]. Hansen, Ibid., 1.
[24]. Hansen, Ibid., 2.
[25]. Hansen, Ibid., 2.
[26]. Hansen, Ibid., 2.
[27]. Hansen, Ibid., 2.
[28]. Hansen, Ibid., 2.
[29]. Strategy Page, 2.
[30]. Strategy Page, 2.
[31]. Roth, Ibid., 2.
[32]. Roth, Ibid., 2.
[33]. Roth, Ibid., 2.
[34]. Roth, Ibid., 2.
[35]. Roth, Ibid., 2.
[36]. Roth, Ibid., 9.
[37]. Roth, Ibid., 9.
[38]. Roth, Ibid., 9.
[39]. Roth, Ibid., 9.
[40]. Roth, Ibid., 9.
[41]. Roth, Ibid., 9.
[42]. Roth, Ibid., 9.
[43]. Roth, Ibid., 9.
[44]. Roth, Ibid., 9.
[45]. Benjamin Armstrong, "Reaching Translational Lift: The History of the
Helicopter and Lessons for 21st Century Technology," Air & Space Power
Journal (5 March 2008),
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/armstrong.html (accessed 17
March 2008).
[46]. Armstrong, Ibid., 2.
[47]. Armstrong, Ibid., 2.
[48]. Armstrong, Ibid., 2.
[49]. Armstrong, Ibid., 2.
[50]. Armstrong, Ibid., 4.
[51]. Armstrong, Ibid., 7.
[52]. Field, Ibid., 20.
[53]. "The Confederate States Marine Corps,"
http://www.wargame.ch/wc/acw/Newsletters/March04/confederate_states-marine-corps.htm
(accessed 25 May 2008).
[54]. "John Brown Biography,"
http://www.notablebiographies.com/Br-Ca/Brown-John.html (accessed 25 May 2008).
Brown was born in Torrington, Connecticut, 4 May 1800. To say he was murderous
and radicalized to the extreme is an understatement. He was executed by the
United States Government on 2 December 1859, subsequent to a trial and
conviction of guilty, as a result of the Harper's Ferry incident.
[55]. Israel Greene,"The Capture of John Brown," North American Review
(December 1885), http://www.iath.virginia.edu/jbrown/igreen.html (accessed 25
May 2008).
[56]. http://www.tricitymarines.com/jbrown.htm (accessed 25 May 2008).
[57]. Field, Ibid., 20.
[58]. Field, Ibid., 20.
[59]. Field, Ibid., 20.
[60]. Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power
(New York: The Free Press, 1991), 161.
[61]. Hagan, Ibid., 161.
[62]. Hagan, Ibid., 162.
[63]. Hagan, Ibid., 162.
[64]. Hagan, Ibid., 162.
[65]. Hagan, Ibid., 162..
[66]. Hagan, Ibid., xi.
[67]. Hagan, Ibid., xi.
[68]. Hagan, Ibid., 162.
[69]. Hagan, Ibid., 162.
[70]. Hagan, Ibid., 16.
[71]. Hagan, Ibid., 162.
[72]. Hagan, Ibid., 162.
[73]. The differences in the names of battles in the American Civil War
resulted from the landmarks near the scenes of the battles that were that
either side would use to designate the name of the battle. The North tended to
call battles according to the name of the nearest body of water to the scene of
the class. In the battle under discussion, this body of water was called Bull
Run. The Confederacy would designate battle names by the nearest city or town
to the battle site; in this case, it was Manassas, VA. The name of the Armies
of North and South followed suit. Northern armies were usually named after
bodies of water: the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the Cumberland, the Army
of the Ohio. Southern armies were usually named after states: the Army of
Northern Virginia.
[74]. Field, Ibid., 21.
[75]. Field, Ibid., 21-22.
[76]. Hagan, Ibid., 165.
[77]. Hagan, Ibid., 165.
[78]. Hagan, Ibid., 165.
[79]. Hagan, Ibid., 166.
[80]. Hagan, Ibid., 166.
[81]. Hagan, Ibid., 166.
[82]. Field, Ibid., 22.
[83]. Hagan, Ibid., 173
[84]. Hagan, Ibid., 172..
[85]. Hagan, Ibid., 172-173.
[86]. Hagan, Ibid., 173.
[87]. Hagan, Ibid., 176.
[88]. Roth, Ibid., 2.
[89]. Hagan, Ibid., 201.
[90]. Hagan, Ibid., 202.
[91]. Hagan, Ibid., 202.
[92]. Hagan, Ibid., 202.
[93]. Roth, Ibid., 2.
[94]. Roth, Ibid., 2.
[95]. Roth, Ibid., 3.
[96]. Roth, Ibid., 3.
[97]. Roth, Ibid., 3.
[98]. Roth, Ibid., 4.
[99]. Roth, Ibid., 4.
[100]. Roth, Ibid., 4.
[101]. Roth, Ibid., 5.
[102]. Roth, Ibid., 5.
[103]. Roth, Ibid., 6.
[104]. "Mexican Campaign (Vera Cruz) Medal of Honor Recipients," The Official
Site of the Medal of Honor, http://www.medalofhonor.com/MexicanCampaign.htm
(accessed 11 December 2007), 1-4
[105]. Roth, Ibid., 7.
[106]. Hagan, Ibid., 245.
[107]. Hagan, Ibid., 246.
[108]. Hagan, Ibid., 246.
[109]. Hagan, Ibid., 246.
[110]. Roth, Ibid., 7.
[111]. Roth, Ibid., 7.
[112]. Roth, Ibid., 7.
[113]. Roth, Ibid, 8.
[114]. Roth, Ibid., 8.
[115]. Roth, Ibid., 8.
[116]. Roth, Ibid., 10.
[117]. Roth, Ibid., 10.
[118]. Roth, Ibid., 11.
[119]. Roth, Ibid., 11.
[120]. Roth, Ibid., 11.
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Written by Steven Christopher Ippolito, Ph.D. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Steven Ippolito at: steveipp@aol.com.
About the author:
Dr. Steven Christopher Ippolito, Ph.D., who spent most of his life in Manhattan and the Bronx, New York (Go Yankees!) is a retired law enforcement officer for the State of New York with nearly twenty years
experience. A full-time professor of Criminal Justice and Homeland Security at Monroe College, New York City, Steve has two Masters Degrees, one from New York University; the other, from Norwich University,
VT., in the very first Military History class of 2007. In August 2017, he earned his Ph.D. from Northcentral University, from the School of Business Administration and Technology, with a specialization
in Homeland Security, under Committee Chair, Kimberly Anthony, Ph.D, and Committee member, Meena Clowes, Ph.D. His dissertation was based on mixed-methodological research into the phenomenon of
convergence, the intersection of crime, terrorism, war, and other forms of conflict (the crime-terror nexus; crime-terror pipeline), as both a homeland security and educational problem. All his
professional research is dedicated to God, Country, and Family, including the wider family of students and academic colleagues. To all of these, and to all first responders, police, fire-fighters,
military personnel, emergency medical personnel, homeland security and emergency management operatives, Steve sends best wishes. May God bless America, now and forever!
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