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Larry Purtell
Little Meadows
PA USA
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September 18,1862
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From the New York Daily Herald. I've been on vacation the last five days and remiss in posting daily updates.
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"My goal is to live forever. So far, so good.
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Phil Andrade
London
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September 18,1862
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Hi Larry,
Hoping you enjoyed your vacation.
Regarding the article, one phrase that reaches out and grabs me is “ perfectly terrific “ : has there ever been a better description of the intensity of the Battle of Antietam ?
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Lightning
Glasgow
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September 18,1862
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This piece reads as how the battle should have went, rather than how it actually played out. McLellan missed a massive opportunity to inflict a fatal blow on the Confederacy.
Cheers,
Colin
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"There is no course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end."
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Phil Andrade
London
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September 18,1862
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Quote: This piece reads as how the battle should have went, rather than how it actually played out. McLellan missed a massive opportunity to inflict a fatal blow on the Confederacy.
Cheers,
Colin
McLellan was more concerned about avoiding defeat than gaining a victory: that’s my interpretation.
I can’t believe the risk that Lee took by standing and fighting there. Outnumbered, outgunned, army exhausted and depleted by straggling, many of the soldiers afflicted with dysentery. Not entrenched. A river to his back.What possessed him ? He himself was in a bad way, after a painful accident. He seemed agitated and his subordinates noticed that he was out of sorts.
I’m sure I’m repeating myself: we have this discussion every year, but my interest and enthusiasm is undimmed and I hope to god that I’m not boring people, Colin !
The plight of Lee’s army at Sharpsburg makes me think of that of Henry V and his band of brothers at Agincourt. The outcomes were rather different, though !
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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DT509er
Santa Rosa
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September 18,1862
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Quote: This piece reads as how the battle should have went, rather than how it actually played out. McLellan missed a massive opportunity to inflict a fatal blow on the Confederacy.
Cheers,
Colin
It seems to me that McClellan did not want to "inflict a fatal blow on the Confederacy", thus his reasoning why he waited things out a bit as he believed he had won a decisive battle without inflicting further harm against the Confederate forces while awaiting their surrender, or at least negotiations for settling matters and ending the war and bringing legendary glory to himself as the savior of the nation.
Dan
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"American parachutists-devils in baggy pants..." German officer, Italy 1944.
“If your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have done a better experiment.” Lord Ernest Rutherford
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Phil Andrade
London
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September 18,1862
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Quote:Quote: This piece reads as how the battle should have went, rather than how it actually played out. McLellan missed a massive opportunity to inflict a fatal blow on the Confederacy.
Cheers,
Colin It seems to me that McClellan did not want to "inflict a fatal blow on the Confederacy", thus his reasoning why he waited things out a bit as he believed he had won a decisive battle without inflicting further harm against the Confederate forces while awaiting their surrender, or at least negotiations for settling matters and ending the war and bringing legendary glory to himself as the savior of the nation. Dan
“One of the war’s mysteries “ : isn’t that how Grant described McClellan ?
He does confound us, doesn’t he ?
For someone who’s supposed to have shied away from combat, he moved quickly when pushing forward to fight Lee in the South Mountain battles. His “ Masterpiece of Art “ at Antietam entailed the bloodiest day of the war. To make the cup run over, Lee named him as his most able opponent.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Michigan Dave
Muskegon
MI USA
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September 18,1862
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Quote:Quote: Quote: This piece reads as how the battle should have went, rather than how it actually played out. McLellan missed a massive opportunity to inflict a fatal blow on the Confederacy.
Cheers,
Colin It seems to me that McClellan did not want to "inflict a fatal blow on the Confederacy", thus his reasoning why he waited things out a bit as he believed he had won a decisive battle without inflicting further harm against the Confederate forces while awaiting their surrender, or at least negotiations for settling matters and ending the war and bringing legendary glory to himself as the savior of the nation. Dan “One of the war’s mysteries “ : isn’t that how Grant described McClellan ? He does confound us, doesn’t he ? For someone who’s supposed to have shied away from combat, he moved quickly when pushing forward to fight Lee in the South Mountain battles. His “ Masterpiece of Art “ at Antietam entailed the bloodiest day of the war. To make the cup run over, Lee named him as his most able opponent. Regards, Phil
Colin, Phil, & Dan,
You are all right on! McClellan was enigma! But still over all as the General to lead the Union to ultimate victory, he was left wanting!? What say ya'll??
Regards,
MD
BTW Larry I also hope your vacay went well, thanks again for posting great contemporary articles on the CW!!
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"The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract."
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Phil Andrade
London
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September 18,1862
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He didn’t seek a war of conquest. He sought to preserve the Union, but was not reconciled to the kind of war that Grant realised would have to be fought.
He was disdainful of Lincoln, to the point of being rude. In this he was bound to antagonise his political bosses, and successful conduct of war depends on good relations between politicians and the military, however strained the circumstances : indeed, the greater the challenge, the more vital this harmony becomes. Little Mac was too puffed up and narcissistic to allow for that.
His soldiers cherished him : they saw him as their Dad and no one replaced him in that regard.
He was a good trainer of troops.
It’s a striking feature of confederate casualty figures that, whenever Lee fought against McClellan, the South paid a high price in blood. In most of the battles against McClellan, the confederates suffered the heavier casualties. That might reflect tactical mistakes by the rebels, or better Union weapons in the earlier part of the war, but I cannot escape the thought that McClellan imparted something to his soldiers that made them effective on the battlefield. Even at Antietam, where the yankees were making very costly attacks, the rebels bled and died in very similar numbers.
That said, it seems to me that the war would never have been concluded with the destruction of the Confederacy if McClellan had been in command throughout.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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scoucer
Berlin
Germany
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Posts: 3189
Joined: 2010
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September 18,1862
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Phil,
On the other hand, his abandonment of his troops during the Seven Days borders on cowardice,and his schadenfreude over Pope´s predicament reeks of dereliction of duty if not treason.
The quote about Lee supposedly calling him his ablest opponent also lies on very dodgy grounds. At third hand 20 years after the war.
Trevor
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`Hey don´t the wars come easy and don´t the peace come hard`- Buffy Sainte-Marie
Some swim with the stream. Some swim against the stream. Me - I´m stuck somewhere in the woods and can´t even find the stupid stream.
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Lightning
Glasgow
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Posts: 1004
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September 18,1862
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I agree with Trevor, I am skeptical that Lee would ascribe the title of his greatest opponent to a man whose army was soundly driven off from Richmond. Likewise, Lee must have known how close his army came to destruction at Antietam, but this was because of his strategic errors rather than any great work by McLellan. In fact, McLellan, with the lost orders, was given the answers to his examination and still managed to fail. The Civil War as a contest should have ended there and then - Lincoln should have sacked him there and then on the battlefield when he refused to go after Lee with all possible speed. I agree McLellan had no interest in crushing the Confederate armies by brute force; he wanted a demonstration that would bring them back into the Union with minimal change and cost in lives.
By contrast, Grant pinned Lee to Petersburg and Richmond for a year, depriving him of the ability to manoeuvre that had allowed his great successes in earlier battles. Grant fought it until the end, in a style of war which was extremely costly but played to his own force's strengths.
Cheers,
Colin
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"There is no course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end."
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Phil Andrade
London
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September 18,1862
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Trevor and Colin,
You won’t find me rushing to McClellan’s defence. And I certainly won’t refute your observations.
I feel circumspect, or even conflicted.
There is, I think, authenticity behind Lee’s alleged high opinion of McClellan’s ability, but I confess that it’ll take me a while to find the evidence I need.
He must have been a real torment for Lincoln. Likewise Joe Johnston for Davis. Both Johnston and McClellan were cited as being excessively slow to engage in battle and reluctant to fight . Lee and Grant , it is legitimately stated, fought too much.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Lightning
Glasgow
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Posts: 1004
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September 18,1862
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As Lincoln said of Grant in the aftermath of Shiloh:
"I can't spare this man; he fights"
Lincoln knew Grant would take the fight to the enemy, wherever his army may be. McLellan and, to a lesser extent, Johnston thought in terms of defending key points like cities, railroads and ports. Grant and Sherman knew that to occupy the South whilst the armies of Confederacy were active in the field was folly. Union victory, especially after the main Confederate armies escaped from Shiloh and Antietam, was inevitably going to be at high cost because of the need to engage the enemy.
By contrast, Lee, IMO, frittered away the lives of many good men in dashing and daring battles which ultimately achieved little, such as the Seven Days and Chancellorsville. Had Lee won several Fredericksburgs in static, attritional battles of tactical defence, the Union civilian appetite for war might have faded far quicker. As it is, he went for the jugular, hoping to knock out the Army of the Potomac and force peace talks. With Grant and Sherman successfully moving in the west, I don't think even crushing Meade at Gettysburg would have ended the war in the South's favour.
Cheers,
Colin
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"There is no course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end."
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Phil Andrade
London
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September 18,1862
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Colin,
By the early summer of 1862, the situation of the Confederacy was dire. Grant’s successes in the West, the Fall of New Orleans and the presence of a hundred thousand yankees at the gates of Richmond combined to make the predicament of the South abysmal.
By the end of that summer, the reversal could hardly have been more dramatic.
This, so Gary Gallagher has told us, is attributable to the intervention of Lee . The impact of his command is hard to exaggerate.
I’m finding significant testimony to Lee’s high opinion of McClellan’s ability, although this was tempered by acknowledgment that he was cautious. Shortly after making such a comment, Lee was astonished to find how quickly Little Mac had moved: indeed, he was caught at a disadvantage thereby as the South Mountain fighting went against him.
If McClellan possessed this high ability, that makes his excessive caution all the more unconscionable.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Phil Andrade
London
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Posts: 6281
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September 18,1862
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When in doubt, consult James McPherson : he always says it so well !
An excellent little book he released in 2002 about Antietam, Crossroads of Freedom, summed up McClellan on page 14 :
He was a perfectionist in a profession where nothing could ever be perfect. His army was perpetually almost ready to move, but could not do so until the last horse was shoed and the last soldier fully equipped. McClellan was afraid to risk failure, so he risked nothing. He consistently overestimated the strength of enemy forces confronting him ( sometimes by multiples of two or three) and used these faulty estimates as a reason for inaction. The caution and defensive-mindedness that McClellan imbued into the Army of the Potomac persisted for almost three years, yielding the initiative to its adversary, commanded after May 1862 by the greatest risk-taker of all, Robert E. Lee.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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morris crumley
Dunwoody
GA USA
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September 18,1862
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I know that Longstreet did not agree with dispatching such a large portion of the army to Harper's Ferry and dividing the force in the heart of enemy territory. He argued against further dividing Lee`s command and said directly to Lee at one point, " General, I wish we would stand still and let the damned Yankees come to us."
Lee had three forces assigned to the Harper`s Ferry, Harvey Hill was at Boonsboro, and Longstreet was then ordered to march a dozen miles to the north to Hagerstown on what turned out to be erroneous information of a Federal force approaching from Pennsylvania. Longstreet forcefully argued against the defense of South Mountain and instead a speeding concentration of the full army at Sharpsburg, a location close in equal-distance from all forces. When McClellan showed unexpected speed at trying to capture Turner`s Gap and Crampton`s Gap, Lee was actually planning for a withdrawal across the Potomac. It was not until he received word from Jackson that Harper's Ferry had fallen and that Jackson could rush forward the next day-that Lee saw the opportunity to make his stand at Sharpsburg and bloody McClellan`s nose.
Needless to say, when Longstreet was ordered to get his troops in motion from Hagerstown to support Hill at turner`s Gap Longstreet was in full protest of a march that would ensure his men to be worn down by march...a march he still felt should not have been needed had he been with Hill at Boonsboro already!
Lee lost a lot of men, good veterans at that, in his attempt to hold off the McClellan`s forces at the South Mountain gaps until he could "round up all the forces "he had so widely scattered.
Respects, Morris
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"You are a $70, red-wool, pure quill military genius, or the biggest damn fool in northern Mexico."
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Phil Andrade
London
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September 18,1862
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Morris,
That post of yours has got me quite agitated !
Wise counsel from Longstreet ignored by Lee in September 1862, and again in July 1863 ?
It’s a bit uncanny.
As for Lee making a reckless stand in order to “bloody McClellan’s nose”, that really speaks volumes.
What about Lee’s nose ?
I’ve just been reading Henry Kyd Douglas’s account of the battle at Sharpsburg, and by his reckoning McClellan was able to pummel Lee’s army with two hundred artillery pieces in the fighting there.
Is that true ?
A mind boggling array of firepower brought to bear on a ragged, outnumbered army that wasn’t even entrenched.
Yes, McClellan did get a very bloody nose.
How did Lee fare in the exchange ?
A recently discovered Elliot map of battlefield burials immediately after Antietam suggests that Lee took outrageous punishment.
Then again, we must be circumspect with this source, too.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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mikecmaps
CAMARILLO
CA USA
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Posts: 206
Joined: 2020
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September 18,1862
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Antietam again 2023September 18,1862
Phil & Group
The account is problematic since “Centerville” not in Washington Co. (that I can find)
And “Kittoctan Creek” (Catoctin Creek ) is substituted for Antietam Creek and being
12 miles east and on the wrong side of South Mountain.
It does say Sharpsburg and Middletown , is correct.
Sorry to be late to the action as usual but havent read a lot lately.
Repeated themes seem weak;
“whenever Lee fought against McClellan, the South paid a high price in blood.”
“By contrast, Grant pinned Lee to Petersburg and Richmond for a year,”
“By contrast, Lee, IMO, frittered away the lives of many good men in dashing and daring battles which ultimately achieved little, such as the Seven Days and Chancellorsville. Had Lee won several Fredericksburgs in static, attritional battles of tactical defence”
“Lee making a reckless stand”
These suggest that Lee attacked to much and lost to many men theme,
which was quantitively disproved by HATTWAY and JONES in
“How the North Won” 1983, their Appendix proved the opposite
Lee was more efficient in Numbers and losses than any other Confederate Leader in battle.
“By the end of that summer, the reversal could hardly have been more dramatic.”
“This, so Gary Gallagher has told us, is attributable to the intervention of Lee . The impact of his command is hard to exaggerate.”
“Longstreet did not agree with dispatching
Longstreet was in full protest
Wise counsel from Longstreet ignored by Lee in September 1862, and again in July 1863” ???
The contrast between Lee’s proven performance and Longstreet’s record as independent commander is massive. Longstreet 100% failure in independent vs Lees for 3 years almost singlehanded keeping the Rebels alive.
Dick Taylor “That any subject involving the possession and exercise of intellect should be clear to
Longstreet and concealed from Lee, is a startling proposition to those having knowledge of the two men.”
“Had Lee won several Fredericksburg’s in static, attritional battles of tactical defense”
This notion is particularly weak in that it suggests the actual strategy that lost the war and suggests that McClellan and Johnston had better ideas – but both were clear failures. And can anyone show the success by any confederate commander who followed the passive defense tactically or strategically??
Also ignores that Lee faced 2:1 force often which meant standing still wont work and contrast the
Overland Campaign with Johnston Atlanta. When Atlanta fell Grant had been stalled 2-1/2 months and
took another 7 mos to take Richmond losing very unfavorable attrition.
Because of 2:1 force Lee was forced to relinquish initiative which he had
done vs no other Union general; Grant faced a hobbled Lee and still took a beating.
“By contrast, Grant pinned Lee to Petersburg and Richmond for a year,”
Again, Grant was defeated in the O’land - failed in “fighting out on this line” after 2 months.
He wanted to land an army at Suffolk or Wilmington but failed to use his own good judgement.
Also shows strategy of destroying Lees army was poor strategy, it was the evacuation of Richmond that defeated LEE;
with no secure base ANV could not survive long no matter who commanded or
by what strategy.
Had Johnston not been wounded Richmond may have fallen by Dec 62 and
Mccellan may have been elected President as the great conqueror in ’64?!
And Finally, Antietam. The event proved the results, Lee got a draw (tactical victory, Ooops) so effective
that Union unable to move for 3 months.
Yes we can all kibitz vs Lee but by whatever measure suggested
here he had the most effective record of any CW commander. Warts and all.
Thanks, Mike_C
mikecmaps
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Phil Andrade
London
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September 18,1862
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Mike_C,
That Dick Taylor quote is priceless !
Bob Krick rather endorsed Taylor’s argument when he wrote that there was “ more than a tincture of the dullard” about Longstreet.
I agree that Lee was a uniquely effective battlefield commander.
I’m also convinced that the anecdote regarding Lee’s opining that McClellan was his most able opponent is true, and that Lee meant it, although it cannot be proved.
Editing: as an afterthought I can’t resist citing a remark made by Grant to a British journalist after the war. He rated Joe Johnston as a better general than Lee.
A comment every bit as remarkable as Lee’s about McClellan ! Indeed, McClellan and Joe Johnston might be cited as counterparts: both criticised for delay, disdain for their political associates and an alleged preference for avoiding combat.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Steve Clements
Toronto
ON Canada
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Posts: 902
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September 18,1862
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Mike,
Quote:These suggest that Lee attacked to much and lost to many men theme,
which was quantitively disproved by HATTWAY and JONES in
“How the North Won” 1983, their Appendix proved the opposite
I think that 'disproved' overstates the case....H&J may have "argued" that Lee did not attack too much etc., etc., but many would disagree. And if you are running the numbers, and include in those numbers the figures of the three armies that Grant accepted surrender from (which includes Lee's ANV)....
On the opposite side of the fence, it has been argued that it was Grant that was the butcher (referring specifically to his attacks against the ANV, during the Overland and early Petersburg campaigns). But there are just as many (if not more) essays that argue exactly the opposite...that it was Lee that was the great waster or men, and not Grant, who after all, was responsible for the surrender of three Confederate armies.
I don't believe that proponents of either general have necessarily "proven" anything-:) Although my own bias is that Lee took too many casualties during '62 & '63...and that Grant almost wrecked the AoP during the summer of '64.
Certainly, Malvern Hill and the Third Day at Gettysburg (the PPT attack, specifically) stand out as offensive tactics that were very unlikely to succeed. And arguably were a massive waste of good manpower.
But the killer - to me, anyways - is Antietam.
Quote:And Finally, Antietam. The event proved the results, Lee got a draw (tactical victory, Ooops) so effective
that Union unable to move for 3 months.
The AoP was hardly "unable" to move for three months...rather, the AoP was paralyzed into inactivity by its commander. And this inactivity cost Little Mac his job!
Yes, Lee did 'earn' a tactical draw at Antietam....albeit, he was forced to retreat and to abandon his Maryland campaign. So IMO, given Lee's need to retreat, Antietam was clearly a defeat. And it should have/could have been a catastrophic defeat....possibly one that witnessed the destruction of the ANV. But that is another story.....
However, the greater question remains: What in hell did Lee think he could accomplish by fighting at Antietam (and not even entrenching).? He brought (arguably) fewer than 40k men of all arms to battle....facing probably close to double that number under LIttle Mac (I do think that the 87k figure that is often bandied about is inflated). And it wasn't as if Lee only fought on the defensive. He counter attacked whenever and where ever he could!
But as Porter Alexander has written, the best that Lee could hope for was a 'draw'.....and then hope that LIttle Mac would be sufficiently negligent as to allow the remains of the ANV to retreat back over the Potomac. If there is a greater example of Lee having his blood lust up during the war, I cannot think of it. That he agreed to fight at Antietam was highly irresponsible, IMO.
But the truly crazy part of Antietam was that, after the blood lust of the 17th, Lee still wanted to turn the AoP's right flank and continue the campaign. With maybe less than 30k men. Just what kind of insanity was that???
s.c.
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Steve Clements
Toronto
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September 18,1862
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Quote: Editing: as an afterthought I can’t resist citing a remark made by Grant to a British journalist after the war. He rated Joe Johnston as a better general than Lee.
Phil,
This quote gets bandied about a fair bit....but when exactly did Grant ever fight against Johnston?? Johnston remained effectively an observer during the Vicksburg campaign, but I don't think that Johnston ever actually fought against Grant.
s.c.
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Phil Andrade
London
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September 18,1862
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Quote:Quote: Editing: as an afterthought I can’t resist citing a remark made by Grant to a British journalist after the war. He rated Joe Johnston as a better general than Lee. Phil, This quote gets bandied about a fair bit....but when exactly did Grant ever fight against Johnston?? Johnston remained effectively an observer during the Vicksburg campaign, but I don't think that Johnston ever actually fought against Grant. s.c.
You’re right, I think, Steve.
Grant , it seems, nurtured a deep fear of Johnston, and the stories I’ve read stated that Grant became agitated about the prospect of Johnston appearing on the scene. It’s an interesting thing to think about: all the more so on account of the fact that he never had to fight him.
By the way, I agree wholeheartedly with you about the propensity of some to attribute “ proof” to statistics which are marshalled to endorse perceptions of generalship. These are arguments, sometimes quite convincing, and they can certainly challenge widely held views. In my experience ,however, inspection reveals-all too often- that the statistics are flawed and sometimes mendacious.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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mikecmaps
CAMARILLO
CA USA
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Posts: 206
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September 18,1862
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09262023
Group,
"That he agreed to fight at Antietam was highly irresponsible, IMO.
Just what kind of insanity was that???"
According to Frederick Maurice in Lee p151,152 (cited in Nevins v2p222) and again this is not me, “By retreating Lee would put his army on the defensive for months to come. That no army fighting a defensive campaign with smaller numbers ever wins a decisive battle is a well-tested maxim of war; Hannibal, Marlborough, Frederick, Washington, Napoleon, Wellington all won their victories when they took the offensive.” I think that covers the notion that second guessing Lee is very persuasive (not). And obviously suggesting “insanity” is hyperbole.
Well, the question posed by Hattaway and Jones in their appendix was exactly that whether Lee attacked too much and lost excessive casualties (I invite you to find it, sorry cant post) and using quantitative analysis THEIR answer was NOT. Lee’s performance in forces vs losses sustained was better than all other confederate battle commanders. Rather sounds like proof to me? Of if we don’t like the answer we can quibble. And what’s more Lee fought 5 important battles between June 62 and June 63, (average 8:5 against; won 4; 1 draw) so certainly he lost more troops because he fought more – the alternative being to be passive and retreat and lose which is what Johnston, Pemberton, Bragg did – is that your model for “successful” alternative. That same time 3 major battles were fought in the west all lost by the confederates.
Hattaway and Jones took the Livermore Hit By 1000 data compared LEE to all union and confederates and the data showed Lee was more efficient in numbers and losses than all confederates and all union battle commanders. Quibble if you wish. The data and method may not be perfect but certainly far better than the typical subjective circular argument that often passes for command performance evaluation.
Alexander “the best that Lee could hope for was a 'draw'” actually by that measure he did the Best he could be expected, No?
“the propensity of some to attribute “ proof” to statistics which are marshalled to endorse perceptions of generalship”
Actually, I am one who does much prefer the quantitative approach where possible because we can all check the work, the data is available and understandable for those with the interest. And we can back track a find where and when and how the data may have been “flawed and sometimes mendacious” and we can evaluate and correct and move understanding forward. And again, the alternative to a quantitative method is some ill-defined subjective guess work and opinion, we all have one, based on some apples to doorknobs comparison made largely as circular reasoning to evaluate our hero was the great hero mainly based on what we knew when we started.
I am not really a particular Lee FAN I know he made mistakes and took risks. Brings me back to Nevins. War for the Union v1 p291 “the general who would not dare” A German officer observer in the Russo-Japanese War “that no worse commander can be found than ‘the leader who does not dare.’” (citing N.Y. Nation March 1905) This is what may perplex many readers. From our arm chair with 20/20 hind sight Lee’s risks may seem insane to some. But its exactly why he was very (not always) successful he took the risks and he knew the obvious and easy objections but he was the general who DID DARE and often, even against daunting odds made the dare pay off.
Finally let me say this is not personal for me. I much enjoy the discussion to test what I think/know and counter arguments are appreciated if they are persuasive and on point. I am a big ACW student and want to learn. But not easily persuaded unless some good info/analysis is offered
yours respectfully, Mike_C
mikecmaps
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6281
Joined: 2004
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September 18,1862
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Mike_C ,
It’s the constant reliance on Livermore that bothers me.
He is cited as the source in the quantitative analysis.
Take Gettysburg, for example. He takes the official number of confederate killed and wounded- 15,301, clearly understated- and blows it up to 22,638 by conjecture. This had been accepted by the number crunchers over a century of commentary. The meticulous research of John Busey which traces the service records has arrived at a figure of 19,094 killed and wounded . A big difference. Livermore Antietam gives Lee 2,700 killed in action because McClellan says so. Really ?
I could go on and on here : his Chickamauga figures for hits per thousand doesn’t allow for significant numbers of Yankee missing in action who had been killed or wounded but were not accounted for when the defeated army abandoned the field. Other examples available, but I’ll be boring if I bang on.
And then there’s the other side of the coin, when huge numbers of prisoners/paroled are lumped together in total casualties and assessed as killed and wounded in attribution of how bloody battles had been in various wars.
Ironically, my observations here are endorsing your view of Lee, not detracting from them.
I think your article on refuting the claim that the ACW was modern is a tour de force. Excellent. Did your assessments of the casualties in the big battles rely on Livermore ?
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Steve Clements
Toronto
ON Canada
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Posts: 902
Joined: 2004
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September 18,1862
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Mike.
Quote:According to Frederick Maurice in Lee p151,152 (cited in Nevins v2p222) and again this is not me, “By retreating Lee would put his army on the defensive for months to come. That no army fighting a defensive campaign with smaller numbers ever wins a decisive battle is a well-tested maxim of war; Hannibal, Marlborough, Frederick, Washington, Napoleon, Wellington all won their victories when they took the offensive.” I think that covers the notion that second guessing Lee is very persuasive (not). And obviously suggesting “insanity” is hyperbole
Disagree. Lee fought on the defensive in '64 - well, he was largely forced to fight on the defensive-:) It really wasn't his choice....the result? Grant almost lost the war by bleeding the AoP dry during Overland and the first several weeks of disjointed attacks in front of Petersburg (see Lincoln's August memorandum attesting to the likelihood of his losing the November election...). Correspondingly, Lee arguably almost won the war by playing 'defense'.
Mr. Maurice chooses to ignore the hard truth that the South didn't have to win the war....they only had to not lose the war. And in the summer of '64, they came very close to doing so. Maybe if some of the casualties that Lee took during the '62 Maryland and the '63 Gettysburg campaigns were still available to Lee in '64, he would have succeeded.
There were indeed times (Seven Days, Chancellorsville) when Lee was forced to go on the offensive in '62 & '63. But it is difficult to reconcile the disparity in casualties that LEe took during Seven Days....especially when one backs out prisoners (assuming that most would eventually be exchanged), and only looks at killed and wounded. So a Malvern Hill, to me at least, had way too much cost for the slim chance of success. Which is the same criticism I would level at the PPT assault on July 3/63.
And no, IMO, there is no hyperbole in my charge of insanity when it comes to Lee agreeing to fight at Antietam.
Rather than use someone else's opinion as to 'why" Lee shouldn't have retreated (to regroup, and fight another day on much, much better terms), I would like to hear your justification for why Lee was wise to fight at Antietam.
Two other points I would toss into the mix concerning Antietam. One, within 4/6 weeks after Antietam, Lee's army had gathered up stragglers and slightly wounded, and was almost right back to the strength it had after Second Bull Run (if one includes the divisions sent from Richmond to Lee after Second Bull Run, to be used in the Maryland campaign). So time was on Lee's side....strengthening (IMO) the argument against fighting at Antietam.
Two. Little Mac. To the extent that Lee understood his opponent, it was unlikely that Little Mac was going to cross the Potomac and not allow Lee time to re-group. There was no shame in not fighting at Antietam. And as per Porter Alexander's comment, there was essentially no chance for any reward. The best outcome was a tactical draw, and hoping that LIttle Mac would allow the diminished ANV to successfully retreat.
s.c.
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mikecmaps
CAMARILLO
CA USA
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Posts: 206
Joined: 2020
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September 18,1862
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Group and Phil and Steve,
Phil,
“It’s the constant reliance on Livermore that bothers me.
I think your article on refuting the claim that the ACW was modern is a tour de force. Excellent. Did your assessments of the casualties in the big battles rely on Livermore ?”
Ok, I continue to say give me the alternative to Livermore? Like it or not Livermore is THE data base that is most comprehensive, authoritative, based on the best- and best-known source; The official records. Reality is there is no other source. And this is clearly demonstrated by The Young data for the Overland Campaign, which I applaud as important and valuable and admirable work but resulted in marginal adjustments and does not change the narrative (not profound) that Lee faced massive disadvantage in numbers throughout, Attrition was close, which has always been available in the Livermore numbers. And yes, I don’t accept Livermore without question. But he shows his work and I can follow along and see what he is doing. Further even his primary source the OFF RECS has may flaws and gaps, true, but there is no real alternative those are the records and the data. We can factor in the weak spots where needed if one truly wants to rely on the best available information.
“assessments of the casualties in the big battles rely on Livermore?”
Of course, what other data would you suggest? I reject quibble about Livermore as a sound basis to understand combat as reflected in the numbers and losses. It is basically at the level of ad hominem – shoot the Messager. Yes, Livermore data is not precise but reality is it’s the best source, if we don’t like where it takes us, I think that’s more about trying to hold to the story in opposition to the data. (make the data fit the story). And very unfortunate that the best source is not used better for more understanding instead of trying to distract from parts of the story.
Livermore “takes the official number of confederate killed and wounded- 15,301, clearly understated- and blows it up to 22,638 by conjecture.” Sorry to say but you appear to be unfair to his data. My copy (facsimile) of his 1900 data for Gettysburg p 102 he give total confederate killed as 3903 and total wounded 18735. ( here we quibble which is not really very useful but . . . ) Total KW 22638 and then another 5425 missing. But you are unfair in your characterizing his process, he cites the OR for all his numbers not by “by conjecture.” The source of your quibble is that he includes 1311 based on his experience factor of 4.8 w for killed – and he shows his work (integrity) if we want to disagree. He also adds in the captured wounded as reported by the union army. Its unfair and not correct to say “22,638 by conjecture.” Thats simply not what he did and his numbers are all sourced with addition of his experience factor, yes you can quibble his experience factor but he does show how that is derived.
One reason I think its important that argue back at attempts to discredit Livermore here is that a 100 or more readers may read these posts and its important that they get good information.
Just did a quick google it cites OR and Busey with 23049 for union losses same as Livermore, and 23231 total for confederate so its about 2% difference with Livermore being higher not lower. Busey’s basic wounded number is lower by less than 20. But his killed number being about 20% higher than Livermore which is significant. But total rebel k&w between Busey and Livermore is that Livermore is 7% higher. So its fair to say overall Busey and Livermore are fairly close. It may be useful to say that Livermore was a federal officer and very mindful the Confederate numbers and losses were often under reported and he tried to correct for that where he could.
Steve,
“South didn't have to win the war....they only had to not lose the war.”
“So time was on Lee's side....”
Respectfully I find these comments surprising, the events demonstrated that these statements were both wrong. The rebels lost by losing and events showed the passive strategy was both ineffective and wrong. Lee’s unmistakable success in strategy and leadership brought the rebels closer to some chance of success than the defensive strategy, though the chance was always very slight. Davis was a big part of losing because he never saw the fallacy of the defensive strategy.
“Rather than use someone else's opinion as to 'why" Lee shouldn't have retreated (to regroup, and fight another day on much, much better terms), I would like to hear your justification for why Lee was wise to fight at Antietam.”
I am happy to share my own impression but I don’t see how I can ignore Maurice? Given my high school education and no military experience my own assessment is Lee’s strategy was the better but a very narrow margin for error which was frittered away by Davis and other unrealistic notions of defensive operations.
“Lee fought on the defensive in '64 - well, he was largely forced to fight on the defensive-:) It really wasn't his choice....the result?”
Which largely demonstrates the case. For two years he kept the double sized union troops at bay by his offensive-defensive strategy but when as you say “forced” to give up the initiative he ultimately had to give up his base which quickly resulted in the surrender – the defense (as Maurice said) by smaller numbers was just not effective.
“Lee arguably almost won the war by playing 'defense'.” Ahh? Yes almost.
But that’s largely true in terms of the attrition. The state of warfare in ACW was that armies had to maintain a solid line position and with substantially smaller numbers Lee knew that he was always liable to have his flank exposed by superior enemy numbers simply going beyond the position he could effectively man. This is why he had to evacuate his base.
I think you mention Antietam counterattacks, the state of warfare in ACW meant that counterattack had to be made to hold on and throw enemy out of the position. A perplexing aspect being the defensive battle winner sometime had heavier casualties by making counterattacks. Again the state of warfare in ACW.
“The best outcome was a tactical draw.” You cite Alexander, between Alexander and Lee its hardly a question to whose judgement is the more reliable and knowledgeable. And by Alexanders own statement Lee realized his best outcome, hardly a convincing criticism.
“concerning Antietam. One, within 4/6 weeks after Antietam, Lee's army had gathered up stragglers and slightly wounded, and was almost right back to the strength it had after Second Bull Run (if one includes the divisions sent from Richmond to Lee after Second Bull Run, to be used in the Maryland campaign).”
Also, can be said to endorse his strategy in that in spite of losses he was back to his base defensive position after keeping the union army on the defensive for 6 months, pretty effective offensive-defensive strategy would be my own humble opinion. And sorry cant find the lee quote about going to ciphering but any criticism based on numbers is pointless since that was the situation from the beginning and through the whole event. Lee’s judgement and strategy that the best way to counter numbers was by holding the initiative proved largely correct.
So sorry to run on so long I don’t disagree with all your points but concentrate on where I have different perspective so may sound negative but its not meant in that way.
Very respectfully and thanks much for great discussion.
Yours,
Mike_C
mikecmaps
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6281
Joined: 2004
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September 18,1862
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Mike_C,
Thanks for your comprehensive reply.
It troubles me that you’re overlooking Fox, who did all the heavy lifting.
Livermore relied largely on Fox.
I myself delved into the Fox volume, used my own extrapolative analysis, very aware of flaws etc.
There’s so much here to discuss.
Hoping to expand on this.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6281
Joined: 2004
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September 18,1862
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Big difference Mike_C,
Busey has made a major research and quite recently published his findings: 3,446 Confederate killed in action at Gettysburg. Another 1,995 died of wounds.
Very different from Livermore’s 3,903 killed in action.
Livermore made a reasonable guess. He extrapolated.
Read his assessment ( I’m sure you have ).
The recent scholarship is astonishing : Young , as you emphasise, has shown us what can be done.
Busey’s recent research into Gettysburg likewise.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6281
Joined: 2004
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September 18,1862
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Mike_C,
Your statement that Busey’s figure for confederate killed at Gettysburg is 20% higher than Livermore’s is, forgive me, erroneous. This Busey figure was including mortally wounded in addition to the killed in action: a very important attribute of the total fatality count. He was using Bob Krick’s analysis that was published in 1985. Livermore’s estimate was for killed in action only. Incidentally, Fox - who, I repeat , did the original heavy lifting - stated that Union killed and mortally wounded at Gettysburg numbered 5,291, with the split being roughly 60% killed and 40% died of wounds. Busey’s latest research gives a confederate total of 5,441 killed and mortally wounded for the rebels at Gettysburg. Was there ever a closer battle in this respect ? !
I’ve really delved into this stuff over the years.
Yes, Livermore is sound work of high integrity, and I’m pleased to possess it. Fox is even better, and Livermore predicates a lot of his stuff on him.
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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Phil Andrade
London
UK
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Posts: 6281
Joined: 2004
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September 18,1862
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Following our Antietam discussion, especially in view of our arguments regarding Livermore etc, please indulge me in a brief survey of the casualty data and the historiography in respect of them. I'll probably have to stop and save or I'll be timed out.
The Union casualties were officially returned as 2,108 killed in action, 9,549 wounded and 753 missing in action, an aggregate of 12,410 for the fighting at Antietam on the 16th, 17th and 18th of September 1862. No separate return of casualties was made by the Confederates for Antietam alone, but they did furnish official statistics for the Maryland Campaign as a whole, returning 1,890 killed in action, 9,770 wounded and 2,304 missing in action. Most historians agree that the missing included a significant number of killed.
Longstreet reckoned that four fifths of all these Maryland casualties are attributable to the Battle of Antietam, and estimated the loss there to have been 11,172, including 1,512 killed, 7,816 wounded and 1,844 missing. I would argue that the figure for missing is too high, since many - maybe most - of them would have occurred in the South Mountain fighting.
The most authoritative estimate compiled was presented by Ezra Carman, whose epic study presented a total of 10,318 Confederate casualties for Antietam, with 1,546 killed in action, 7,754 wounded and 1,018 missing. McClellan was adamant that the rebels had taken heavier casualties than his own troops, and stated that " about 2700 of the enemy's dead were.....counted and buried upon the battle-field of Antietam", adding that, in addition " a portion of their dead had been previously buried by the enemy."
Notwithstanding the credit that I have given Livermore in my previous post, I cannot escape the impression that he had " an agenda" as far as this battle is concerned. He writes in the footnotes to his compilation " The number of Confederate dead cannot be placed at less than the number counted and buried on the field." Why, I wonder, was he so keen to accept Little Mac's claim ? By that criterion, we would be looking at many battles in which inflated claims are countenanced as truth. He goes further, and places the total confederate casualties at 13,724, with 2,700 killed, 9,024 wounded and 2,000 missing. Then he goes further still, and cites his figure of 9,024 wounded as being too small, given the ratio of 4.5 wounded to every one killed that pertained to the Union army at Antietam. So he reckons that the number of wounded " should be increased to 12,000."
But, wait a minute ! What about the additional " portion of their dead...previously buried by the enemy" ? Why not factor them in as well, increase the number of killed, and inflate the number of wounded correspondingly ? It starts to look a bit like a curtain call in the theatre, with increasing numbers of actors coming out to receive the applause of the audience . Ultimately , it's as if half of Lee's army was killed, wounded or captured ! I honestly suspect that Livermore was " up to something" here, and how significant it is that he always insisted that Lee had well over fifty thousand men at Antietam, instead of the forty thousand or fewer that is generally credited.
We've alluded to the excellent research made by Busey and Young regarding Gettysburg and The Overland. Let me recommend another excellent source for Antietam casualties , a website run by Brian Downey : ANTIETAM ON THE WEB. One of the features included is THE DEAD LIST, which counts and names all the dead from both sides in the Battle of Antietam and the entire Maryland Campaign. This study is ongoing and is updated as the numbers increase, but the results so far are very compelling and indicate how advanced and effective these new methods of research have become.
For the Battle of Antietam alone, including the skirmishing of the 16th and 18th of September 1862, the Union dead are counted and named as 2,209 killed in action, with another 998 dying from their wounds. For the Confederates, the numbers are 1,690 killed in action and 793 died of wounds. These rather corroborate the Carman totals for Lee's army, with the implication that there were numbers posted as missing who had indeed been killed. Note, also, the died of wounds represent just over ten per cent of the initially reported wound cases in both armies. I'm a bit surprised that the number is not higher. OTOH, this is ongoing research , last updated on the 11th June 2022, and I expect that more names will be added. As it is, the claims of Little Mac appear a bit fragile.
There is, however, good reason for supposing that Lee's army took disproportionate punishment in making this stand, especially since the Union firepower advantage was so manifest in numbers and weaponry. A significantly higher proportion of the yankee artillery was rifled, and a higher percentage of the yankee infantry carried rifled muskets. Lee's deployment made maximum use of terrain to enhance defensive positions, although there was no entrenching. This was not enough to protect his men from the massive artillery fire that Hunt unleashed from nearly three hundred guns. I believe a higher proportion of confederate casualties than normal was attributable to artillery fire .
And, to show that I keep an open mind, I'll cite one piece of evidence that does support McClellan's claim. A recently discovered Elliot burial map of the Antietam battlefield, based on a survey soon after the battle, indicated the graves of 5,844 soldiers, of which 2,634 were union and 3,210 confederate. My only misgiving here is that Elliot had inflated the number of Confederate graves in the Wheatfield at Gettysburg.
There's enough to think about here, isn't there ?
Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"
"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."
Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
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