You allude to a service which did not recognise elites. That comment intrigues me. If you’re willing, please expound.

Regards, Phil

Those numbers you cite are scandalous .

When I read Churchill’s critique of the way the British armies were expended on the Western Front in the war of 1914-18, it strikes me as ironic that he was reconciled to such appalling arithmetic as that which afflicted the efforts of Bomber Command in the earlier part of the Second World War.

I suppose that it was a determination to be seen to be doing something aggressive against Germany, at a time when so many things had been going badly.

A statement of sorts, and a a grotesquely expensive one in terms of the exchange rate : especially given the value of experienced crew.

Brian,

Was there a rationale that accepted the loss of tens of thousands of aircrew as a price worth paying for the saving of a million infantrymen ?

Maybe the revulsion against the slaughter of 1914-18 was a determinant here.

A resolve to save flesh and blood by deploying metal and technology found its expression in the reliance on Bomber Command.

Callous expenditure of one cohort : fifty five thousand , not to mention hundreds of thousands of civilian victims.

Regards, Phil

• was it as badly broken as it appeared to be after 7/8 November?
• was it fixed?
• did anyone want to fix it?

I think it would be ridiculous of anyone to suggest Bomber Command was a highly functioning military organisation in 1941 or even 1942. Clearly the Allies wanted a way to strike directly at Nazi Germany immediately, as they were unable to do so with their respective armies and navies.

I'm sure the hierarchy wanted it fixed - any fix would do - but clearly everyone was learning as they went along.

Might there also be another element here we haven't acknowledged? Sending airmen to their deaths over Germany somewhat placated the Soviet Union, who were doing the vast bulk of the fighting and dying against Nazi Germany and were demanding an Allied contribution/diversion to take the pressure off in any way. Perhaps the Allies were willing to accept the heavy losses of the air campaign to demonstrate to Stalin that they were at least doing some of the dying?

Placating the Soviets was surely an important feature of the determination to press home attacks against the German people.

Placating the British people themselves might have been to the fore as well.

Until the high summer of 1941, British civilian deaths from aerial bombardment exceeded those of military personnel in action.

Hitting back was an important attribute of morale.

The arithmetic was grotesque , judging by what Brian has revealed. Surely the disparity between the loss rates and the damage inflicted was kept secret from the public. I’m convinced that Churchill himself was under no illusions in this regard : he was not one to subscribe to group think, and his record in the Great War stands as a reminder that he was conspicuous in his discernment of statistical data, and his determination to challenge interpretation of them. Look no further than his August 1916 memorandum.

WSC was, IMHO, fully conscious of what was happening in RAF Bomber Command. And he was for the most part a pragmatist (though he was a blind, unthinking believer in Empire). His worst decisions (IMHO) were made based on his political/imperial biases; his best on real situations. He recognized the need for a force like Bomber Command to carry the war to the enemy immediately after the Battle of Britain: you don’t win a war through successful defence.
Brian G