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(1939-1945) WWII
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John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre
PA USA
Posts: 1121
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/16/2020 2:03:09 PM

Phil,

As a percentage of the total number of US battle casualties what are the combine total of the two Philippine campaigns?

Are the Philippine Army casualties from 41-42 included in your total?

Are the captured from 42 included? Should they be included in the total?


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A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country. "to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"
Phil Andrade
London
 UK
Posts: 4498
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/16/2020 2:23:34 PM

John,

Until Friday, I’m away from home.

As soon as I do my Douglas MacArthur, and return , I will get my books and answer your questions.

Regards, Phil
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"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!" "That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress." Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
Phil Andrade
London
 UK
Posts: 4498
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/19/2020 1:59:10 PM

John,

All I can offer are the figures from Clodfelter.

For the earlier battles of 1941-2, he cites " Over 5,000 American and Filipino soldiers had died in battle in the Luzon Campaign, most of them on Bataan. "

He doesn't break down into US and Filipino contingents, but he emphasises the great subsequent loss of life in atrocities against POWs by the Japanese, and he implies that three quarters of these victims were Filipino.

For the 1944-45 battles he is more precise, giving US casualties as 62,143, including 13,700 KIA.

He reckons Filipino deaths, 1941-45, as 62,500 military and 200,000 non combatant. He cites 7,000 Filipino KIA 1941-42, 8,000 guerrillas KIA 1942-45, and 42,000 ( out of 98,000) who dies while prisoners of the Japanese.

In a later table he cites US Army Battle deaths in the Philippines at 30,424 : this surely includes deaths while POW.

Another tabulation is a bit more elaborate, for US Army.

For 12.7.41 -5.10.42 he gives 30,838 casualties, of whom 13,847 were dead ( mostly POWs).

For 10.17.44- 7.4.45 he gives 60,717 casualties. of whom 16,233 were fatal.

This amounts to just under 10% of total US Army battle casualties for all theatres ( 936,259)

I wanted to honour my pledge to you. Hope this helps.

Regards, Phil
----------------------------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!" "That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress." Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre
PA USA
Posts: 1121
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/20/2020 12:04:03 PM

Phil,

Are you excluding US Navy, USN and USMC, casualties for both campaigns and the total for the war when you say "US Army battle casualties for all theatres?" The bulk of the 4th Marines were present in 41-42 as were significant Naval personnel. Plus there were Kamakazi and naval battle casualties in 44-45.
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A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country. "to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"
Phil Andrade
London
 UK
Posts: 4498
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/20/2020 3:51:15 PM

Yes, John, in this case I noted that Marines and Navy are not included.

Also, the Battle Casualty criteria are different from ours : we would not include POWs who died in captivity as battle deaths, while US figures do.

So I find the Clodfelter tabulations a bit bewildering, and struggled to get a truly coherent picture.

Regards, Phil
----------------------------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!" "That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress." Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre
PA USA
Posts: 1121
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/20/2020 4:29:05 PM

Phil,

The 4th Marines were the core of the Corregidor defense force and Naval Bats fought as infantry on Bataan in 41-42 not to mention Buckley's PT Boats and aux ships sunk at Subic in the initial bombings. Then in 44-45 you have the attack of the IJ Fleet and the introduction of large scale Kamakazi attacks.

Plus should Peleliu be included because Mac insisted it be taken to protect his flank?

My initial thought was counting the Phil Army and the POW's taken we would be talking close to 15% of all US casualties in the war. I know the surrendered troops really up the total.
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A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country. "to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/24/2020 4:24:49 AM

Quote:
Phil,

As a percentage of the total number of US battle casualties what are the combine total of the two Philippine campaigns?

Are the Philippine Army casualties from 41-42 included in your total?

Are the captured from 42 included? Should they be included in the total?




http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/P/h/Philippine_Islands.htm

25,000 killed, 21,000 wounded
10,380 killed and 36,550 wounded

Total: 35,380 KIA, 56,550 WIA, =91930


http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/C/a/Casualties.htm
111,606 253,142

Total:364748

Two campaigns KIA/WIA
35,380 KIA 56,550 WIA

Total of US two campaigns KIA/WIA in all pacific losses of same, 25% of all losses.

KIA 32% of total Pacific war US KIA/WIA
WIA 22%





https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=kNzCDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA511&lpg=PA511&dq=two+Philippine+campaigns+us+casual;ties&source=bl&ots=ntub1yO-Hz&sig=ACfU3U0A32tkAvpmMevtF-hELuUjT6yLAg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjn4O7_07LoAhUySEEAHQwdDd8Q6AEwFnoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=two%20Philippine%20campaigns%20us%20casual%3Bties&f=false

Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and ...
By Micheal Clodfelter
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Phil Andrade
London
 UK
Posts: 4498
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/24/2020 4:57:37 AM

Nick,

Presumably the KIA figure includes POW deaths ?

Regards, Phil
----------------------------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!" "That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress." Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/24/2020 5:10:14 AM

Quote:
Nick,

Presumably the KIA figure includes POW deaths ?

Regards, Phil


I doubt that.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/index.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/Casualties-Intro.html#summary

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Phil Andrade
London
 UK
Posts: 4498
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/24/2020 5:59:48 AM

Quote:
Quote:
Nick,

Presumably the KIA figure includes POW deaths ?

Regards, Phil


I doubt that.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/index.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/Casualties-Intro.html#summary



How can 25,000 be KIA and 21,000 WIA unless the preponderance of the former include POW deaths ?

Regards, Phil
----------------------------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!" "That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress." Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/24/2020 7:32:47 AM

Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
Nick,

Presumably the KIA figure includes POW deaths ?

Regards, Phil


I doubt that.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/index.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/Casualties-Intro.html#summary



How can 25,000 be KIA and 21,000 WIA unless the preponderance of the former include POW deaths ?

Regards, Phil


As the links set out, KIA is exactly that a death in combat, while a death as a pow is non combat death and tabulated separate from KIA.
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Phil Andrade
London
 UK
Posts: 4498
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/24/2020 9:22:02 AM

Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
Nick,

Presumably the KIA figure includes POW deaths ?

Regards, Phil


I doubt that.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/index.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/Casualties-Intro.html#summary



How can 25,000 be KIA and 21,000 WIA unless the preponderance of the former include POW deaths ?

Regards, Phil


As the links set out, KIA is exactly that a death in combat, while a death as a pow is non combat death and tabulated separate from KIA.


Looking under the bonnet, so to speak, I examined the criteria set out for classification of Battle Deaths, and they are set out in the source :

All persons killed in action, dead as a result of wounds or injuries received in action, declared dead from missing in action, and dead of non battle causes while in a battle casualty status of captured, interned or missing in action.

British battle deaths are compiled by different criteria, confined to KIA, DOW and MIA presumed killed. Prisoners of war who died in enemy captivity are not included as battle deaths unless they are known to have died of wounds whilst POW.

A revealing UK statistical summary, produced in 1947, enumerates all combat deaths in all theatres, all branches of military service, and attributes only 12.8% of all combat deaths to the war against Japan. Were the deaths of British POWs to be included - especially those in the building of the Burma Railway - then the total would be much higher...perhaps around 20% ?

Regards, Phil
----------------------------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!" "That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress." Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/24/2020 10:42:53 AM

Quote:

All persons killed in action, dead as a result of wounds or injuries received in action, declared dead from missing in action, and dead of non battle causes while in a battle casualty status of captured, interned or missing in action.


Looking under the bonnet, so to speak, I examined the criteria set out for classification of Battle Deaths, and they are set out in the source :


You looked under the wrong hood.

The question was the number of KIA and WIA and if they include death as a pow, they do not, not battle deaths, which is another thing entirely.

KIA and WIA do not contain deaths from pows, they are tabulated seperatly and can be combined to become a consolidated battle losses number value. Your confusing combat related KIA/WIA numbers with consolidated numbers that include them and non combat losses.(The column "Total deaths among battle casualties" includes these non-battle deaths plus those persons who were killed in action, died of wounds and injuries received in action, or were declared dead from a missing in action status.)
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/Casualties-Intro.html
CONTENTS
Battle Casualty Tables

The major portion of this report (pages 8 through 95) is concerned with battle casualties, and except for two tables (page 47 and pages 92 through 95) includes comprehensive data on their subsequent disposition.

Battle casualties are grouped into four principal categories of "Killed in action," "Wounded and injured in action," "Captured and interned," and "Missing in action." They are shown further by the outcome or disposition of each casualty. For instance, statistics on personnel wounded and injured in action contain not only the total reported in that category, but also the number that died of battle wounds and injuries in the oversea commands, the number returned to duty in the oversea commands, and the number evacuated to the United States. Data onevacuees who died of battle wounds and injuries are shown in a separate column.

Information on the subsequent disposition of battle wounded or injured personnel evacuated to the United States is not available, except for those cases recorded by The Adjutant General as having died of their wounds or injuries. Determination of the disposition of the remainder - returned to duty, separated, died of other causes not attributable to the wounds or injuries, etc. - would have required an exhaustive and expensive examination of personnel records. Although the non-battle deaths among this group of battle casualties cannot be isolated and shown as dispositions of battle casualties, they are recorded in the non-battle death columns of the tables in this report concerned with all Army deaths.

Columns are provided for non-battle deaths under the major categories "Captured and interned" and "Missing in action" in order to show what happened to individuals initially reported as battle casualties, but who subsequently died of disease or other non-battle cause while still in a battle casualty status. The column "Total deaths among battle casualties" includes these non-battle deaths plus those persons who were killed in action, died of wounds and injuries received in action, or were declared dead from a missing in action status.

The totals for the major battle casualty categories "Killed in action," "Wounded and injured in action," and "Captured and interned" represent all persons who were ever reported in those categories (exclusive of erroneous reports). This is not the case, however, for the "Missing in action" total. Missing in action was essentially an unknown status, and consisted of personnel whose whereabouts or actual fate could not be determined and whose disappearance was presumed to be the result of enemy action. Most of the cases originally reported in this category were transferred to a killed in action, wounded and injured in action, or captured and interned status, as established by subsequent information. The remainder are shown in this report under the missing in action dispositions of declared dead, died of other causes (non-battle), or returned to duty.

The table on pages 10 through 45 contains time series data relating to the year and month of occurrence of each casualty, and not to the date of final disposition of the casualty. For example, a person initially reported as wounded in action who subsequently died of wounds is recorded as "Died of wounds" in the year and month in which he was wounded.

Battle and Non-battle Death Tables

The tables on pages 96 through 117 provide data on all deaths of Army military personnel. The battle deaths comprise persons who were killed in action, died of wounds and injuries received in action, or were declared dead from a missing in action status. The non-battle deaths consist of deaths not attributable to battle causes, and include persons who died of disease or other non-battle cause while in a battle casualty status, in addition to all other non-battle deaths Army-wide.

Deaths are recorded in the time series tables on pages 96 through 111 by year and month of death. Persons who were declared dead are shown by year and month of death established in the findings of death made by the Chief, Casualty Branch, AGO (see "Declared Dead" on page 4).

Geographic Area Table

Consolidated battle casualty and death statistics are furnished in the table on page 118 entitled "Battle casualties and deaths, by geographic area of residence." The table contains columns for total battle casualties and for battle and non-battle deaths of personnel in a battle casualty status. These deaths among battle casualties plus those of persons not in a battle casualty status (other non-battle) comprise total Army deaths.


Killed in Action--Persons coming within the purview of "battle casualties," as defined above, who were killed outright, or who died of wounds or injuries before reaching an aid station or other medical treatment facility. This category includes persons in a captured status who were killed outright by air bombardment or while trying to escape.


Wounded and Injured in Action--Persons coming within the purview of "battle casualties," as defined above, who were wounded or injured. This category includes all kinds of wounds and injuries received in action whether there was a piercing or tearing of the body, as in a penetrating wound, or none, as in a contused wound; fractures whether simple or compound; burns, blasts, concussions, etc. This report includes only those wounded or injured in action personnel requiring hospitalization, except that those who died of wounds or injuries after reaching some type of medical treatment facility but before reaching a hospital are also included.


Battle deaths--All persons killed in action, dead as a result of wounds or injuries received in action, or declared dead from missing in action. This term excludes non-battle deaths of personnel in a battle casualty status of captured, interned, or missing in action. (See "Deaths Among Battle Casualties.")

Battle Casualties--All persons killed in action, dead as a result of wounds or injuries received in action, wounded or injured in action, missing in action, captured by the opposing forces, or taken into custody by the authorities of a neutral country as internees. The term "in action" characterized the casualty status as having been incurred as a direct result of enemy action during an engagement or otherwise, or sustained while immediately engaged in, going to, or returning from a combat mission whether or not due to enemy action. reporting.


Non-battle Deaths--In the battle casualty tables, this category consists solely of persons who died of disease or other non-battle cause while in a captured, interned, or missing in action status. In the death tables, this category consists of all non-battle deaths, Army-wide, and is comprised of those who died of non-battle causes while in a battle casualty status of captured, interned, or missing in action, as well as all other non-battle deaths.
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Phil Andrade
London
 UK
Posts: 4498
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/24/2020 12:19:35 PM

Nick,

Looking under the hood is proving a distinctly dangerous operation.....the hood’s likely to come down and chop my head off !

My head’s still on my shoulders, but it’s spinning a bit at the moment , and I will defer to you.

Thinking of this brings the Fall of Singapore to mind.

I suspect that, in the actual combat, not much more than a couple of thousand British, Australian and Indian soldiers were killed in action or died from wounds. The number captured by the Japanese was immense....the best part of one hundred thousand, I should think. The number who died in that vile captivity must have exceeded the combat toll several fold.

Didn’t something similar happen to the US forces in the earlier Philippines campaign ?

Regards, Phil
----------------------------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!" "That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress." Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/25/2020 6:19:31 AM

Quote:
Nick,

Looking under the hood is proving a distinctly dangerous operation.....the hood’s likely to come down and chop my head off !

My head’s still on my shoulders, but it’s spinning a bit at the moment , and I will defer to you.

Thinking of this brings the Fall of Singapore to mind.

I suspect that, in the actual combat, not much more than a couple of thousand British, Australian and Indian soldiers were killed in action or died from wounds. The number captured by the Japanese was immense....the best part of one hundred thousand, I should think. The number who died in that vile captivity must have exceeded the combat toll several fold.

Didn’t something similar happen to the US forces in the earlier Philippines campaign ?

Regards, Phil


If we have campaigns US KIA and WIA numbers from a source, then to avoid comparing to US Battle casualties ( which counts different things) its better to compare to KIA/WIA numbers. Or use battle casualties throughout.
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-us-military-numbers

US MILITARY CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR II

Branch Killed Wounded
Army and Air Force 318,274 565,861

Navy 62,614 37,778
Marines 24,511 68,207
Coast Guard 1,917 Unknown
TOTAL 407,316 671,278

So a campaigns KIA/WIA is better understood as a % of the above, better yet deduct the Air force losses, which i dont have to hand.

I think you mean the losses inflicted in Bataan death march which occurs during the campaign, so those losses would appear in a campaign casualty return,while the Uk pows experience was after the end of the Malaya campaign in construction of rail in Burma etc and would not appear in a campaign casualty return, otoh, there were instances of atrocities that would show up in the campaign, https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_2014-04-07_090735.html .

Depends on the book/source, if its a campaign orientated one it may not look beyond its focus at all, or it may be the whole history of the conflict etc. There are even specialist studies on war crimes/atrocities https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP3.HTM See the link to table 3.1.

In my youth a cat could get under my first cars hood and sleep on a warm spot, now i cant even see any spare space at all!.

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John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre
PA USA
Posts: 1121
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/25/2020 11:13:08 AM

Nick,

Thanks for your input and thoughts.

Have you read "Pacific Hurtgen" by Robert Young?

Not sure I agree with the idea to deduct Air Corps loss because not all of the loss was from strategic bombing. There was tactical that was campaign specific. Plus you would also have to go and subtract Navy and Marine Air from those totals.
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A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country. "to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/25/2020 11:58:27 AM

Quote:
Nick,

Thanks for your input and thoughts.

Have you read "Pacific Hurtgen" by Robert Young?

Not sure I agree with the idea to deduct Air Corps loss because not all of the loss was from strategic bombing. There was tactical that was campaign specific. Plus you would also have to go and subtract Navy and Marine Air from those totals.


You are all welcome to whatever pops into my mind.....

I looked at some reviews and it had a mixed bag ( one mentioned many units had little mention of them, 1st Cav for instance, which is easy to remedy as Div histories are easy to find, https://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00047652/00001/93j note the difference in battle deaths and KIA at end of report.) so doubt i will be looking at it any time soon, since its not a particular area of interest for me.

My thinking was that AAF losses would distort the big picture, ( 5616 KIA in training accident in the USA alone in 44) but of course it depends what question your looking to get a better understanding on.
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John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre
PA USA
Posts: 1121
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/25/2020 5:20:28 PM

Nick,

The book really wasn't about mentioning every unit and what they did. The focus was after Manila and the tactics, casualties(all) taken from that point and MacArthur's leadership or lack of hands on leadership from that point. The battle focus was on the attacks on the dams and the attack up Route 5 if memory serves into the Cagayan Valley.

Looking for the total number of all casualties and the percentage of that total that the two Phil campaigns are.
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A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country. "to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/26/2020 6:33:01 AM

Center for Military History (CMH) has some of that.

https://history.army.mil/index.html

https://history.army.mil/brochures/luzon/72-28.htm

Analysis
Technically, the battle for Luzon was still not over when Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945. On the northern part of the island Shobu Group remained the center of attention for the better part of three U.S. Army divisions. Altogether, almost 115,000 Japanese remained at large on Luzon and on some of the southern islands. For all practical purposes, however, the battle for control of Luzon had been over since March.

MacArthur can be both lauded and criticized for the Luzon Campaign. On the one hand he had swiftly recaptured Manila and all areas deemed critical for further operations against the Japanese. On the other hand the enemy was not totally subdued and the Japanese troops still posed a serious threat even after several months of fighting. But many other Japanese garrisons had been left behind along the road to the Japanese heartland-just as in the European theater the Allied commanders had virtually ignored many German garrisons remaining along the French Atlantic coast and on the English Channel. After June, only a limited number of forces were needed to keep Shobu Group on the defensive. More significantly, Shobu Group, representing the largest Japanese troop concentration on the islands, contributed little to the defense of Luzon. In the end they appeared more concerned with their own pointless survival as a force in being than in interfering in any way with American designs. The Japanese decision to fight a

29
passive war of attrition set the tone for the entire campaign. Had Yamashita conducted a more active defense, one that did not meekly surrender the initiative to the Americans, the struggle might have been shorter but much sharper. In such a case, MacArthur's single-minded drive on Manila might have been judged a risky venture and the diversion of troops to liberate other minor islands a dangerous practice. And had the Americans suffered even minor reverses on the battlefield in the early days of January and February, the struggle might also have been prolonged until August at an even heavier cost in American lives.

Taken altogether, MacArthur's offensive had contained or taken out of the war over 380,000 Japanese, rendering them unavailable for the defense of the homeland. In the final analysis, the fall of Luzon meant once and for all that the Japanese Empire was doomed. The battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf had left its fleet in tatters, and the ground campaigns that followed turned the once-proud Japanese Army into a shadow of its former self.

Casualties on both sides were staggering. Except for those forces surrendering at the end of the war, the Japanese lost virtually all of the 230,000 military personnel on Luzon, in addition to some 70,000 casualties from the previous battle on Leyte Island. By the summer of 1945, the Americans had thus destroyed nine of Japan's best divisions and made another six combat-ineffective. Losses stemming from the battle so drastically reduced Japanese air power that the use of kamikaze operations was necessary throughout the rest of the war.

American casualties were also high. Ground combat losses for the Sixth and Eighth Armies were almost 47,000, some 10,380 killed and 36,550 wounded. Nonbattle casualties were even heavier. From 9 January through 30 June 1945, the Sixth Army on Luzon suffered over 93,400 noncombat casualties, including 260 deaths, most of them from disease. Only a few campaigns had a higher casualty rate.

https://history.army.mil/faq/FAQ-C&C.htm
Link is out of service but FAS has it also.

Number of Army Personnel who Served During Each Major War, and the Number of Casualties Incurred
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf
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Phil Andrade
London
 UK
Posts: 4498
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/26/2020 9:36:02 AM

John and Nick,

Clodfelter is on my shelves.

To put it bluntly, it’s damned hard work trying to make sense of the tabulations of US casualties in the war.

Clodfelter himself admits this. There are inconsistencies and contradictions throughout.

There are emphatic caveats that Battle Deaths include died while POW.

In one of these bewildering arrays of tabulations I did pick one thing up that might serve this thread : there is a table of US Army battle deaths by locale, and the figures for the Philippines and Italy are almost identical : 30,424 and 30,050 respectively .

Total battle deaths in the war against Japan are recorded as 92,904, of whom 12,935 were POWs.

Of this total , 41,686 are attributed to the Army, 31,485 to the Navy, 19,733 to the Marines.

Trying to reconcile the several tables - a mind boggling job - I conclude that nearly three quarters of all US Army dead in the war against Japan are attributable to the Philippine campaigns, and about fifteen per cent of all US Army battle dead for all theatres. Of these Philippine battle deaths, more than one third were POWs .
Any mistakes are mine.

Regards, Phil
----------------------------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!" "That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress." Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/26/2020 12:59:00 PM

Quote:


Total battle deaths in the war against Japan are recorded as 92,904, of whom 12,935 were POWs.

Of this total , 41,686 are attributed to the Army, 31,485 to the Navy, 19,733 to the Marines.





You missed out the AAF losses and merchant marine and civilian losses, thus making your total to low.

US combat deaths in War against Japan Total deaths among battle casualties, 57,137 is the US Army position.

Army Air Force 14,607

US civilian deaths in War against Japan

Merchant Marine(est) 4,000.
Pearl Harbor 68
Oregon(balloon bombings) 6
Died in Japanese internment 1,563

Quote:

Trying to reconcile the several tables - a mind boggling job - I conclude that nearly three quarters of all US Army dead in the war against Japan are attributable to the Philippine campaigns, and about fifteen per cent of all US Army battle dead for all theatres. Of these Philippine battle deaths, more than one third were POWs .
Any mistakes are mine.


If the entire 18500 US Army in the Philippines became battle deaths in 42, plus the 10,380 battle deaths in 44/5 it would still be only 57% of the Pacific Theatre battle deaths, and its 6% of all US Army battle dead for all Theatres not 15%.

US Army Losses in 44/5
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Triumph/index.html#contents
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Triumph/USA-P-Triumph-H.html
10,380 battle deaths

http://www.mansell.com/pow_resources/camplists/philippines/pows_in_pi-OPMG_report.html US Army was 18500 strong in Philippines. Clodfelter has included all US forces in his numbers, and has 3331 as US Army battle deaths. 13711 for both campaigns which is 24% of Pacific Theatre battle deaths.


https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/Casualties/Casualties-1.html
US Army Total battle casualties Pacific Theatre, 169,635,Total deaths among battle casualties,57,137, KIA,35,909
US Army Total battle casualties All Theatre, 936,259, Total deaths among battle casualties 234,874, KIA 189,696

US Army in Pacific as a % of all Theatres is 18% of all battle casualties, as a % of deaths among battle casualties, 24%, and as a % of KIA, 19%.
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John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre
PA USA
Posts: 1121
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/27/2020 1:35:54 AM

Nick,

I'm not sure Yamashita could have conducted a more active defense, US air superiority and soppy and transport shortages on the Japanese side combined with Japan's plan ro fight a war of attrition from day one. Yamashita did exactly the same type of defense as on Pelelui, Iwo Jima and Okinowa. Plus I'm sorry the loss in air power leading up to this campaign and a short sighted pilot training program made the Japanese start the Kamikaze attacks here and one that line was crossed there was no going back in that culture.

What about the Wawa Dam not being a major supplier of water to Manila since 39 I believe? Just a few thoughts.
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A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country. "to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/27/2020 5:48:54 AM

Quote:

I'm not sure Yamashita could have conducted a more active defense, US air superiority and soppy and transport shortages on the Japanese side combined with Japan's plan ro fight a war of attrition from day one. Yamashita did exactly the same type of defense as on Pelelui, Iwo Jima and Okinowa. Plus I'm sorry the loss in air power leading up to this campaign and a short sighted pilot training program made the Japanese start the Kamikaze attacks here and one that line was crossed there was no going back in that culture.


I agree.

Quote:

What about the Wawa Dam not being a major supplier of water to Manila since 39 I believe? Just a few thoughts.

Novaliches Reservoir supplied Manilas water, 10 miles northeast of Manila, taken by US on February 5. But this was fed via aqueduct from Ipo Dam ( proved a third of Manilas water supply), held by 9k Japanese, and was in Japanese hands and agricultural production has ceased in that region when Japan took control, as was Wawa Dam, ( if re connected to water supply for Manila would provide 15% of requirements) held by 12k and did not provide water to manila but was used to irrigate the low lands which supported the crops to feed the 12k in the erea and of course Manila and other Japanese formations with food crops.


MacArthur to krueger on Manila water shortages, “cutting daily consumption in Manila to one half and depriving south side of river of any city water except what is carried in tanks. In summary CMA water shortage is bringing back danger of epidemic of enteric disease from which city was apparently escaping. Outbreak of real magnitude might well prove great military disaster. This situation will be remedied as soon as the reservoir in the Montalban area is secured. What is your estimate as the time when this will be accomplished?”

Two dayslater, Krueger radioed back, “Do you mean Ipo Dam?”

MacArthur April 22: “Capture of Ipo Dam would provide definitive solution for Manila water supply problem and is highly preferable as objective.”

Wawa Dam campaign de emphasised by MacArthur in favour of Ipo, was as much due to the regions ability to self sustain the strong Japanese forces, time constraints due to rainy season, as well as the 15% of Manilas water requirements if reconnected.
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RichTO90
Bremerton
WA USA
Posts: 560
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/27/2020 2:09:22 PM

Quote:
John and Nick,

Clodfelter is on my shelves.

To put it bluntly, it’s damned hard work trying to make sense of the tabulations of US casualties in the war.

Clodfelter himself admits this. There are inconsistencies and contradictions throughout.

There are emphatic caveats that Battle Deaths include died while POW.


Phil,

You need to carefully read the Introduction in Army Battle Casualties and Non-Battle Deaths in World War II. It should clarify things.

Battle Casualties -All persons killed in action, dead as a result of wounds or injuries received in action, wounded or injured in action, missing in action, captured by the opposing forces, or taken into custody by the authorities of a neutral country as internees.

Battle deaths - All persons killed in action, dead as a result of wounds or injuries received in action, or declared dead from missing in action. This term excludes nonbattle deaths of personnel in a battle casualty status of captured, interned, or missing in action.
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John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre
PA USA
Posts: 1121
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/28/2020 11:33:38 PM

Nick,

With respect you are using excuses from after the war to explain a major mistake. Theatre command should understand the strategy behind the assignments it orders before giving the orders. It isn't like this is foreign territory with a hostile population. The orders to attack Wawa Dam were given in March with simultaneous attacks against Ipo Dam diluting the attacks against both and basically forcing frontal attacks against mutually supporting prepared positions. Neither attacking element had enough strength to exploit the weakness of open or lightly guarded flanks and rear.

Plus there was no transfer of troops nor slacking of operations against Wawa after 4/22.
----------------------------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country. "to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/29/2020 7:05:42 AM

Quote:

With respect you are using excuses from after the war to explain a major mistake.


You asked a question"What about the Wawa Dam not being a major supplier of water to Manila since 39 I believe?" and i gave an answer, with a time line of events and actions taken, which are facts, not excuses, from the war time reports of when lack of water for Manila was known and action taken.

Theatre command directed a corps commander to take different action in light of a change in circumstances.

Corps commander was conducting operations, as directed by Theatre command, to secure Manila from counter attack and long range artillery fire by conducting operations towards Wawa, first across the productive agricultural lands then the high ground beyond with its dam that fed those lands, to turn the northern flank of the Japanese defensive line, and secondary operation to take/mask the centre of the defensive line at Ipo dam that provided water for urban area, after the turning movement had devolved, and to contain the southern end of the defensive line. Theatre command intervened to make the Ipo frontal attack a priority over the turning movements operation.

Ill ask you two questions, 1)Manilas population in 41 was 680k, so did not need wawa capacity, but by Jan 44 the OSS advised it to be 1.5 million for planning purposes, and 44 was a drought year, so where do you think the extra water came from for the city?.

2) When captured water gauge on Novaliches resorvior showed 5 billion gallons, out of its 12 billion capacity, San Jaun resorvior held 20 million gallons but needed a weeks work to become safe to use, online end of Feb 45, and thats was what water MacArthur had when the Japanese cut supply to the city and he wanted it restored, why would any military planner, in any age, not understand how long a population of 1.5 million can be supplied from 5 billion gallons of water? and to what extent should that water supply amount influence the pace or direction of operations?.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=nCzpvlnDVUUC&pg=PA618&lpg=PA618&dq=manila+water+supply+in+ww2&source=bl&ots=UpxG2zC3NQ&sig=ACfU3U3ki4kezzb5ifTHgLYYrhR02HYXiw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwih3Oj087_oAhXARxUIHdTvBrsQ6AEwEXoECAwQAQ#v=onepage&q=manila%20water%20supply%20in%20ww2&f=false

Quote:

Theatre command should understand the strategy behind the assignments it orders before giving the orders.


Theatre Commanders design the strategy, ( “south first” strategy in this instance, "It would be better to contain and reduce the enemy forces there" wrote Macarthur to Corps commander on Ipo Dam in Feb ) , and coordinate operations and exploit tactical events to support overall campaign objectives.

Corps commander was complying and in full knowledge of, and acting to impement,Theatre commands strategy.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=BSrFX51AGPMC&pg=PA367&lpg=PA367&dq=wawa+dam+february&source=bl&ots=jfH_nhUi6f&sig=ACfU3U34TbcGDGI0w_tF3Ee9Fpfrvvyuvg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjujMiZu7_oAhUCShUIHQqtCA0Q6AEwBnoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=wawa%20dam%20february&f=false

Quote:

It isn't like this is foreign territory with a hostile population.


But it was hostile territory with nearly twice the hostile population US G2 estimated, because the Japanese had anticipated and planned how to counter, for exactly the operation put into operation by Krueger.

Quote:

The orders to attack Wawa Dam were given in March with simultaneous attacks against Ipo Dam diluting the attacks against both and basically forcing frontal attacks against mutually supporting prepared positions. Neither attacking element had enough strength to exploit the weakness of open or lightly guarded flanks and rear.


The first orders were given in Feb to attack Wawa and cover Ipo (" Theatre command to corps command for Ipo "It would be better to contain and reduce the enemy forces there".) and acted on it Feb and were in accordance with theatre commands instructions. Different orders with different formations attacked again in May for Ipo, "to be taken intact as soon as possible", https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=M0svg4ZhSa0C&pg=PA250&lpg=PA250&dq=wawa+combined+arms&source=bl&ots=LUp_NNsbpV&sig=ACfU3U2uTMJXMQEzaFpi0UDS3iPZeEckbA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiaisqcw7_oAhWjp3EKHdk6DCkQ6AEwCXoECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=wawa%20combined%20arms&f=false Lastly further orders in March allowed the sequential taking of Wawa by flank attack, and then Ipo. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Y_BmAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA53&lpg=PA53&dq=wawa+dam+water+supply+under+japanese&source=bl&ots=Nje5vCgTIU&sig=ACfU3U1wMDweiAQKwDdZyFkce_qOo0wL7A&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiSu8fN1b_oAhWHRhUIHRk6ADc4FBDoATACegQIChAB#v=onepage&q=wawa%20dam%20water%20supply%20under%20japanese&f=false

Quote:

Plus there was no transfer of troops nor slacking of operations against Wawa after 4/22.


Except for those that did.https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=urgMbwFwEqMC&pg=PA288&lpg=PA288&dq=wawa+dam+captured&source=bl&ots=rD8e1ucu5d&sig=ACfU3U3qxlSee4Upt9-qZt_4rxDGCNT8tg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjLrtjSvb_oAhVWThUIHYtQDEwQ6AEwDHoECAYQAQ#v=onepage&q=wawa%20dam%20captured&f=false

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=u9BQAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA403&lpg=PA403&dq=Wawa+Dam+orders+march&source=bl&ots=AgWAqj9Mlm&sig=ACfU3U0KmtFTNUhVBa_nsnMEGKGj9HBZWg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi1nvn_yb_oAhWUs3EKHencAucQ6AEwAnoECAQQAQ#v=onepage&q=Wawa%20Dam%20orders%20march&f=false


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John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre
PA USA
Posts: 1121
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/30/2020 6:44:39 AM

Nick,

You can't claim Wawa was going to make up the shortfall and that is why the continued attacks because they didn't know if the no longer in use system to bring the water into the city worked, if it could be fixed, how long it would take to fix but they did know that even at maximum it could bring in no more than 15% of the need. Go to the previous chapter the first para state they screwed up. Also in the section "US Army Campaigns of WWII;Luzon"
"The main objective of XIV Corps' attack against Shimbu Group was to gain control of the Manila water supply, most of which came from dams along the Angat and Marikina Rivers some twenty miles northeast of the city. Here the coastal plains gave way to rolling mountains and plunging valleys carved by rivers flowing toward the sea. But two crucial errors affected the operation before it even began. First, the Americans did not realize that the Wawa Dam, thought to be one of Manila's sources of water, had been abandoned in 1938 in favor of the larger Ipo Dam in the Marikina Valley. The Wawa Dam could have been bypassed, but Krueger did not realize his error for almost two months. Second, intelligence badly underestimated Shimbu Group's strength, reckoning that there were fewer than 20,000 Japanese troops east of Manila when, in reality, there were about 30,000. Enemy defensive positions were strung out along a thin line about thirty miles long running from Ipo Dam in the north to the town of Antipolo in the south. The Japanese positions alone were of little strategic value, but together they commanded all the high ground east of Manila. "

Also another point I haven't really made from the same source,
"By mid-February Krueger's Sixth Army staff had begun planning operations against those Shimbu Group forces closest to Manila. Although still concerned about Shobu Group troop concentrations in northern Luzon, both Krueger and MacArthur agreed that the Manila area, the potential logistical base for all American activities on Luzon, still had first priority. Nevertheless, MacArthur made Krueger's task more difficult in the coming weeks by continually detaching troop units from Sixth Army control and sending them to the southern and central Philippines, which had been bypassed earlier. These diversions greatly impaired Krueger's ability to deal with both Shobu and Shimbu Groups at the same time."


----------------------------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country. "to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/30/2020 8:51:54 AM

Quote:

You can't claim Wawa was going to make up the shortfall and that is why the continued attacks because they didn't know if the no longer in use system to bring the water into the city worked, if it could be fixed, how long it would take to fix but they did know that even at maximum it could bring in no more than 15% of the need. Go to the previous chapter the first para state they screwed up.


With respect you are using claims of mistakes that are contradicted by the evidence we have from 44/5. It was not a mistake to take 3 of the 4 installations intact by Feb 9th and secure the water supply, it was not a mistake to take the 4th one intact either, it was actually an excellent outcome hardly to be expected as they were all mined ready to blow. No field orders ( 47-50) in Feb for wawa mention water.

I hoped you were going answer what i asked, and to explain to me where you thought the extra water for twice the population for Manilla came from when under Japaense control, your reply does not relate to the question asked. Where did the water for twice the population come from?.

The first paragraph explains Wawa operation was part of the Theatre commanders design to secure the Manilla region, there being no water shortage at that time.

I had already explained 6th Army in 1944/5 had not consider wawa part of the water supply for Manilla but will do so again in more detail for you. There were 4 places the Army thinks are in the water supply chain for manilla, wawa was not one of them.

Report of the Luzon campaign, 9 January 1945 - 30 June 1945, volume I.http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll8/id/2307/rec/9

"This report presents the operations of the Sixth Army in the Luzon Campaign. It
includes the decisions made by the Army Commander, the considerations which led to those
decisions and the way in which they were carried out."


"On 5 February 1945 the Commander directed XIV Corp to seize, in accordance with a given priority, the principal features of the Manila Water Supply System in
the water shed area east of the city, making the maximum effort consistent with the demands of the tactical situation. Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy intended
to destroy or possibly pollute the source of water for the Manilla area. Early seizure
of these sources of water supply was therefore vital to the health and even to existence
of the city's population."


"A special force from the 7th
Cavalry Regiment captured Novaliches Dam, one of the main features of the Manila water ,
system. The enemy had placed demolition charges at key points on the dam but the rapidity
of its seizure by our forces prevented his blowing the structure. On 7 February 1945 the
division seized the Balara Filters intact.
"

"By 9 February 1945. the
37
division was disposed along the north bank of the Basig River as shown in Diagram 15.
On that date, elements of the 7th Cavalry Regiment captured San Juan Reservoir, thus
securing three of the four main features of the Manila Water System, Ipo Dam being the
only one not yet secured.
"

Who are they?, what mistake did they make and when did they make it?.



You also avoided question 2, which was a shame because it also helps explain the timeline of events.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=24NPAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA363&lpg=PA363&dq=military+water+requirement+per+day+manilla&source=bl&ots=C4ZhYWzGed&sig=ACfU3U36qUXkesDEjqFvjcwCBkSoPlQCxQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjcqIbmgsLoAhUJEcAKHSY0AuwQ6AEwAHoECAUQAQ#v=onepage&q=military%20water%20requirement%20per%20day%20manilla&f=false

10,000 leaks in the manilla water pipes reduced water supply by 65%, and was the principle problem, after all the dams were in US hands, the peak consumption of water in Manilla in Aug 45 was 65.2 million gallons, ( met by US water distribution centres) and the Balara filtration units max capacity for Manilla supply was 50 million a day.

Feb 9th US has control of 67% of the water supply, and has on hand 5 billion in Novaliches, 20 million in San Jaun, filtration for distribution of water for manila, was out for a week so no water for anyone, so 16th it starts to reduce from demand at max of 50 million a day.


Ipo dam water supply is a max of 16500000 gallons a day lost to income, so consumption is met from stocks as water income is lower than water income, stocks will be depleted in 303 days from when Ipo is closed to supply, if supply from filtration is at 100% capacity. Macarthur cuts supply by half In April just to be safe.

On 9th Feb Mac knows from technical services he has enough water supply, cuts orders to krueger to secure Manila environs towards wawa and mask Ipo Dam, time is not a factor yet, and Ipo is still providing water till April when they close the supply, now we have a problem Houston, and Macarthur cuts new orders to Krueger to make it proirity.


Quote:

Also in the section "US Army Campaigns of WWII;Luzon"


Problem here is time line, 6th Army report shows orders from Krueger to take Wawa ( mask IPO Dam which is in the supply system) in late Feb are not because its part of the Manila water supply and there is a problem Huston, but because its where Macarthur ordered him go and secure in his Feb orders where securing Manila from attack and capture and rehabilitation of the region central plain is given first priority, and IPO Dam in Feb is not important to Manilas water supply as it has plenty of stock and 100% of income still coming in. See pages 404 triumph Philopines for how that changes in April, and it drops to 67% https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=u9BQAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA404&lpg=PA404&dq=krueger+and+ipo+dam&source=bl&ots=AgWAriaKhp&sig=ACfU3U06nQfhSifac3d82BpUhk65juw8VA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjLoZSPnMLoAhXDoFwKHSBCCBMQ6AEwBXoECA0QAQ#v=onepage&q=krueger%20and%20ipo%20dam&f=false

Quote:

Also another point I haven't really made from the same source,


Timeline, this is the mid Feb understanding by Corps commanders of theatre commanders design, to secure the Manila area as priority, and why Kreuger goes towards Wawa first, in accordance with Theatre commanders “south first” design., which was determined back in November so came as no surprise to anyone.

It will help if you/we establish in your/my own mind, or written out, a timeline of events and actions taken, then you can see cause and effect. When you do you will find that Wawa Dam not being a major supplier of water to Manila since 38 as is a post war claim, and therefore the 2 months spent there were a mistake to be unsupported by the documentation we have for 44/5.
----------------------------------
John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre
PA USA
Posts: 1121
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/30/2020 3:38:27 PM

Nick,

1st Krueger is 6th Army, MacArthur theatre commander, Krueger 6th Army commander, Griswald IVX Corps commander and Hall IX Corps commander.

2nd capturing the reservoirs don't mean squat if you don't control the dam that feed those reservoirs, ie Ipo. The reason why Novaliches is so low is the Japanese shut off the flow of water from Ipo Dam to it.

The Japanese got the water from Ipo.
----------------------------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country. "to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"
Nick Spencer
IOW,United kingdom
 UK
Posts: 196
Hey Phil a casualty question for you
Posted on: 3/31/2020 7:14:38 AM

Quote:

1st Krueger is 6th Army, MacArthur theatre commander, Krueger 6th Army commander, Griswald IVX Corps commander and Hall IX Corps commander.


?, you think they, is all of them?. All of them worked under the following priorities.

"Establishing priorities for the capture of individual installations, Sixth Army ordered XIV Corps to secure first Novaliches Dam, at the southern end of a large, man-made lake in rising, open ground about two and a half miles east. of the town of Novaliches. (See Map V.) Second came the Balara Water Filters, about five miles northeast of Manila's easternmost limits and almost seven miles east of Grace Park. (See Map VI.) Third was the San Juan Reservoir, on high ground nearly two miles northeast of the city limits. Fourth were the pipelines connecting these installations and leading from them into Manila. Ultimately, Sixth Army would secure other water supply facilities such as a dam on the Marikina River northeast of Manila, but not until it could release men for the job from Manila or other battlegrounds on Luzon"

Quote:

2nd capturing the reservoirs don't mean squat if you don't control the dam that feed those reservoirs, ie Ipo. The reason why Novaliches is so low is the Japanese shut off the flow of water from Ipo Dam to it.


With respect this contradicts all the facts we know and is a timeline that has no basis in fact.

We know the Novaliches dam/reservoir and the two others, can supply enough water for over 300 days, from 9th Feb, at 100% capacity output of the filtration system, thats mathematical fact from the US Eng report of water quantity quality reports. We know its in receipt of water from IPO because the US Corps of Eng (33%) and Macarthur, tell us how much its contribution to Manilas water supply in its Feb to April reports on a weekly basis."Ipo Dam normally supplied over 30 percent of Manila's fresh water supply" this is from the weekly water reports he received in water income, and how he knew it changed when Ipo supply was cut in April and water income declined.

The reason Novaliches capacity was where it was, when captured, is because of how the seasonal changes in water supply worked, and still work, in the Manila watershed. Novaliches dam/reservoir which increased its capacity to hold water to 12 billion gallons 36-39, ( From the annual 38 dam report, its capacity which increases to filling the reservoir in rainy season,June, July, August, September and October, and depleting in dry season,January, February, March and April, provided annually, 5000,000,000 gallons to Manila in 1938, ie before IPO Dam comes online and increases capacity) on The Tullahan river sytem was a major water supplier for Manilla, the 13 mile 45 inch bore pipeline from Ipo dam on a different river system, ran to the reservoir and this pipeline, under pressure, was captured intact and was running water, which was treated with chlorine to be made safe till April, as explained by in the link provided from, Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan, Volume 2; Volume 6 and technical reports to Macarthur on water quality and quantity which only changed in April.Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1945: Reports of Volume 6

Quote:

The Japanese got the water from Ipo.


So, since US knows during Feb-April, 30% of Manilas requirement is met from Ipo, then the 70% from other sources at Novaliches dam/reservoir does not mean squat, it means you can supply yourself for 300 days without it.

It also means that under Japanese control to supply twice the Manila population of 38/39 requires twice the volume of water, and IPO was able to provide 30% of that increase in the dry season, it follows then that in the rainy season it supplies 70% of yearly requirement, and thats why in April Mac wanted IPO controlled intact, before the rainy season came so as to insure water supply.

Sanitation problem in April are from low water pressure, from the damage to the pipes in Manilla, to overcome this you can increase water supply which maintains water pressure but wastes water, 65% lost according to the US CoE till repairs completed in August. This problem existed from day 1 of control of Manilla, got worse when Ipo supply ended in April.
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